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Abstract 
Reputation based adaptive buying agents that reason about sellers for purchase 
decisions have been designed for B2C ecommerce markets.  Previous research in the 
area of buyer agent strategies for choosing seller agents in ecommerce markets has 
focused on frequent purchases.  In this thesis, we present reputation based strategies 
for buyer agents to choose seller agents in a decentralized multi agent based 
ecommerce markets for frequent as well as infrequent purchases.  
We consider a marketplace where the behavior of seller agents and buyer agents can 
vary, they can enter and leave the market any time, they may be dishonest, and 
quality of the product can be gauged after actually receiving the product.  Buyer 
agents exchange seller agents’ information, which is based on their own experiences, 
with other buyer agents in the market.  However, there is no guarantee that when 
other buyer agents provide information, they are truthful or share similar opinions.   
First we present a method for buyer agent to model a seller agent’s reputation.  The 
buyer agent computes a seller agent’s reputation based on its ability to meet its 
expectations of product quality and price as compared to its competitors.  We show 
that a buying agent acting alone, utilizing our model of maintaining seller agents’ 
reputation and buying strategy does better than buying agents acting alone employing 
strategies proposed previously by other researchers for frequent as well as for 
infrequent purchases. 
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Next we present two methods for buyer agents to identify other trustworthy buyer 
agent friends who are honest and have similar opinions regarding seller agents, based 
on sharing of seller agents’ information with each other. In the first method, buyer 
agent utilizes other buyer agents’ opinions and ratings of seller agents to identify 
trustworthy buyer agent friends. Reputation of seller agents provided by trustworthy 
buyer agent friends is adjusted to account for the differences in the rating systems and 
combined with its own information on seller agents to choose high quality, low priced 
seller agent.  In the second method, buyer agent only utilizes other buyer agents’ 
opinions of seller agents to identify trustworthy buyer agent friends.  Ratings are 
assigned to  seller agents by the buyer agent based on trustworthy friend buyer 
agents’ opinions and combined with its own rating on seller agents to choose a high 
quality, low priced  seller agent to purchase from. 
We conducted experiments to show that both methods are successful in distinguishing 
between trustworthy buyer agent friends, whose opinions should be utilized in 
decision making, and untrustworthy buyer agent friends who are either dishonest, or 
have different opinions.  We also show that buyer agents using our models of 
identifying trustworthy buyer agent friends have higher performance than a buyer 
agent acting alone for infrequent purchases and for increasing numbers of sellers in 
the market.   
Finally we analyze the performances of buyer agents with risk taking and 
conservative attitudes.  A buyer agent with risk taking attitude considers a new seller 
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agent as reputable initially and tends to purchase from a new seller agent if they are 
offering the lowest price among reputable seller agents.  A buyer agent with 
conservative attitude is cautious in its approach and explores new seller agents at a 
rate proportional to the ratio of unexplored seller agents to the all the seller agents 
who have sent bids.   Our results show that, when buyer agents are making decisions 
based on their own information, a buyer agent with conservative attitude has the best 
performance.  When  buyer agents are utilizing information provided by their trusted 
friends, a buyer agent with risk taking attitude and using only  trusted friend buyer 
agents’ opinions of seller agents has the best performance.  
In summary, the main contributions of this dissertation are: 
1. A new reputation based way to model seller agents by buyer agents based on 
direct interactions. 
2. A protocol to exchange reputation information about seller agents with other 
buyer agent friends based on the friends’ direct interaction with seller agents. 
3. Two methods of identifying trustworthy buyer agent friends who are honest 
and share similar opinions, and utilizing the information provided by them to 
maximize a buyer agent’s chances of choosing a high quality, low priced 
seller agent to purchase from. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction                                                                                                        
1.1 Motivation 
The Electronic Commerce Association defines ecommerce as “electronic commerce 
[that] covers any form of business or administrative transaction or information 
exchange that is executed using any information and communications technology” 
[48].  It is a very broad definition covering activities like purchasing goods over the 
telephone or using credit cards to make purchases.  In this dissertation, ecommerce is 
used to refer to the buying and selling of goods on the Internet.  According to the 
Consumer Buying Behavior (CBB) model which covers Business to Consumer (B2C) 
transactions [33], there are six fundamental stages of the buying process.  
 Need Identification:-The buyer becomes aware of an unmet need through 
advertisement of a product or through friends. 
 Product Brokering:-Evaluation of different products to determine which one 
meets the need. 
 Merchant brokering:-Evaluation of merchants based on criteria like price, 
warranty, etc specified by the buyer. 
 Negotiation:-Settling on the terms of the transaction. 
 Purchase and delivery. 
 Product service and evaluation. 
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These stages are approximate and may overlap.  Software agents can be used in the 
various stages of the buying process.  Agents are suited as mediators in ecommerce 
due to their personalized, continuous and autonomous nature.  The use of agent 
technologies in the various stages of the buying process helps combat information 
overload, expedites several stages of the buying process, and reduces transaction 
costs [33].  Bargain Finder [30] is an agent that helps a buyer in finding a CD vendor 
who is offering the lowest price; however, the agent is not autonomous in making the 
purchase decision and a human is still involved in that stage.  In most of the current or 
“first generation” ecommerce applications, buyers are humans browsing through an 
online catalog of products and making purchases through credit cards.  With advances 
in agent technology, the degree of sophistication and automation is increasing and in 
the near future automation is expected on both the buyer and seller sides [25].  In 
“second generation” agent mediated ecommerce, agents will be acting on behalf of 
buyers and sellers [25].  On the buyer’s side, the buyer agent can be expected to help 
the buyer in identifying desired seller and even negotiate with the seller’s agent to 
maximize the buyer’s gains.  
In traditional commerce, humans do the thinking; they have the knowledge, are able 
to deal with uncertainty, and are adaptive by learning from past experiences and by 
utilizing the knowledge from their trusted sources.  In agent mediated ecommerce, 
agents have to be equipped with these abilities to be able to perform the same jobs as 
humans do in traditional commerce.  The design of agents that are autonomous, 
intelligent, can deal with uncertainty and incomplete information, and can learn and 
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adapt to a changing environment would be a significant contribution in the area of 
ecommerce research. 
1.2 Overview and Main Contributions 
 Previous research in the area of buyer agent strategies for choosing seller agents in 
ecommerce markets has focused on frequent purchases.  The work in this dissertation 
advances the state of the art by presenting reputation based buyer strategies for 
choosing high quality, low priced sellers which works for frequent as well as 
infrequent purchases. 
This work considers decentralized, open, dynamic, uncertain and untrusted electronic 
markets where selling agents acting on behalf of sellers are offering goods for 
purchase to buying agents representing buyers.  The goal for a buyer agent (hereafter 
referred to as buyer) is to purchase a product from a seller agent (hereafter referred to 
as seller) who meets its expectations of quality and service, and to purchase it at the 
lowest price possible in the market.  At the same time, buyer wants to reduce its 
chances of interacting with dishonest and poor quality sellers.  In an open market, 
sellers and buyers can enter and leave the market anytime.  In a dynamic market, 
players in the market need not exhibit the same behavior all the time; sellers can vary 
the price and the quality in various transactions.  Untrusted market implies there 
could be dishonest sellers in the market.  In an uncertain market, buyers can gauge the 
quality of the product only after actually receiving the product.  There could be a 
onetime transaction between the buyer and the seller or multiple transactions between 
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them.  There is no limitation on the number of sellers and buyers in the market.  
These characteristics are typical of a traditional commerce market and hence an 
electronic market with similar characteristics is considered in this research.  
Products with the following characteristics are considered for sale in the above 
mentioned electronic market: the quality of goods can be ascertained only after 
actually seeing it, the quality of the goods varies across the sellers, and the same 
product by the same seller may be perceived differently by separate buyers depending 
on their preferences and budgetary constraints.  The above mentioned types of goods 
are classified as “look and feel with variable quality” goods in contrast to commodity 
products where the quality of the product can be ascertained from afar [13].  Fresh 
produce, artwork, food items like bread and cakes from specialty stores, and online 
flower vendors are examples of “look and feel with variable quality” goods, the kind 
of products we consider sellers to be offering for purchase.  Products like books, toys, 
CD’s sold on websites like Amazon are considered quasi commodity products [13] as 
there is some differentiation within a product niche.  A buyer first identifies a 
particular product to be purchased; the buyer then chooses an online seller based on 
the price and the reliability of the seller. 
It is not possible to pre-program an agent to operate in an open, dynamic, and 
untrusted market conditions, or to know beforehand who the best seller for a buyer is, 
as new sellers are entering the market, lowest priced seller may not necessarily be the 
best seller, and sellers could be lying.  Agents have to be equipped with abilities to 
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make the most rational decision based on all the information that they can gather.  
They should be able to learn from their past experiences. 
Recent research has developed intelligent agents for ecommerce applications [8, 9, 
14, 18, 30, 49, 50, and 53].  However, as Tran [49] summarizes, agents in [14, 30] are 
not autonomous, agents in [8, 9, 14, 18] do not have learning abilities, agents in [53] 
have significant computational costs, and agents in [8, 9, 14, 18, 30, 53] do not have 
the ability to deal with deceptive agents.  Tran and Cohen’s work [49, 50] addressed 
these shortcomings by developing a strategy for buying agents by using 
reinforcement learning and reputation modeling of sellers.  However, their model 
builds reputation slowly and a buyer has to interact with a seller several times before 
the seller is considered reputable.  This model works well where a buyer has to make 
repeated transactions with the sellers during frequent purchases.  The performance of 
this model deteriorates for infrequent purchases as the buyer has to purchase several 
times from a seller before making its decision about the seller.  When the buyer is 
purchasing a product on an infrequent basis, it needs to quickly identify reputed 
sellers.  First in this dissertation, a reputation based modeling of a seller by the buyer 
based on its own interactions with sellers which can work for frequent as well as 
infrequent purchases is presented in a B2C ecommerce market. 
Reputation based adaptive buying agents that reason about sellers for purchase 
decisions initially explore the market by interacting with various sellers and gradually 
learn to identify desirable sellers based on their own experiences.  During the 
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exploration phase they may interact with undesirable sellers who are charging high 
prices or offering poor quality or are dishonest and hence they may incur losses.  
When buyer agents collaborate with honest and similar thinking buyer agent friends 
by exchanging seller reputation information, they are able to reduce the exploration 
time and hence the cost associated with exploring [3].  In this dissertation, buyers are 
considered to be members of online communities in which individuals can join and 
leave as they wish and can exchange reputation information about sellers with each 
other in order to identify a trustworthy seller who meets their product expectations 
and is selling the product at the lowest price. 
When buyer agents exchange seller reputation information there is no guarantee that 
the party replying is honest or, if honest, that they share same opinions regarding 
product expectations as the buyer agent requesting the information.  Opinions can be 
subjective; consider two sellers s1 and s2 selling the same product but at different 
qualities and prices, and two buyers b1 and b2 who purchase the product.  Let s1 be 
providing mediocre quality at a low price, and s2 be offering a higher quality product 
at a higher price.  If buyer b1 is conscious about keeping the costs low and is satisfied 
with mediocre quality, b1 will consider s2 to be expensive and rank seller s1 higher 
that s2.  For buyer b2, if high quality is of utmost importance and cost is secondary, 
b2 would prefer to buy from seller s2.  These two buyers cannot use seller 
information from each other in decision making even if information is exchanged 
honestly, as their preferences and opinions differ. 
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Now assume that, buyers b1 and b2 share similar opinions and both consider s2 to be 
a good seller; however, they may not have the same rating systems.  For example, 
b1’s reputation rating for s2 might be 0.8 on a scale of 0-1 and b2’s reputation rating 
for s2 might be 80 on a scale of 0-100.  When these buyers exchange reputation 
information, they need to adjust the reputation ratings provided by each other to 
translate them into meaningful values on their own rating scales.  In the previous 
example, when b1 obtains s2’s rating from b2, it has to scale it down 100 times before 
using the reputation value in its decisions.  Hence, before utilizing the information 
provided by another buyer friend, a buyer has to ensure that they share similar 
opinions regarding products purchased and the numerical seller rating exchanged be 
adjusted to account for the differences in the rating systems. 
In this dissertation we present two methods of identifying trustworthy buyer friends, 
who are honest and share similar opinions, and utilizing the information provided by 
them to choose high quality, low priced sellers.  
Specifically, in an open, dynamic, decentralized, uncertain and untrusted market 
where the same product may be perceived differently by different buyers, the main 
contributions of this dissertation are: 
1. A new reputation based modeling of a seller by the buyer based on its own 
interactions with sellers, for both frequent and infrequent purchases. 
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2. A protocol to exchange reputation information about sellers with other buyer 
friends based on their direct interaction with sellers. 
3. Two methods of identifying trustworthy buyer friends who are honest and 
share similar opinions, and utilizing the information provided by them to 
maximize a buyer’s chances of choosing a high quality, low priced seller. 
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Chapter 2 Related Work                                                                                                     
Chapter 2 presents a review of the relevant work done in related areas.  We begin by 
reviewing the definition of agents and ecommerce followed by a discussion of agents 
and agent models in ecommerce.  In the last section we talk about various trust and 
reputation models that have been developed. 
2.1 Agents  
Woolridge [54] defines agents as: “… a computer system that is situated in some 
environment and that is capable of autonomous action in this environment in order to 
meet its design objectives”.  Pattie Maes [32] also gives a similar definition 
“Autonomous agents are computational systems that inhabit some complex dynamic 
environment, sense and act autonomously in this environment, and by doing so 
realize a set of goals or tasks for which they are designed.”  An agent is considered to 
be intelligent if it is capable of responding to its environment (reactivity), has the 
ability to take the initiative (proactiveness) and can interact with other agents or 
humans (social ability) in order to achieve its goals [55].  They may also be adaptive, 
flexible, temporally continuous, mobile, and communicative with other agents.  All 
software agents are programs but the reverse is not true.  For this dissertation we 
consider software agents as computer programs that exhibit the qualities of agents.  
They are autonomous, reactive, proactive, and adaptive. They may also be temporally 
continuous and communicative with other agents. 
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2.2 Ecommerce 
The Electronic Commerce Association defines ecommerce [48] as “electronic 
commerce [that] covers any form of business or administrative transaction or 
information exchange that is executed using any information and communications 
technology.”  It is a very broad definition covering activities like purchasing goods 
over the telephone, using credit cards to make purchases, automatic billing, order 
tracking, etc.  Commonly, ecommerce refers to buying, selling and exchanging of 
goods and services over a computer network like the internet.  There are four main 
categories.  In business to consumer (B2C) ecommerce, businesses sell to the general 
public.  Online retailing is an example of B2C ecommerce.  In business to business 
ecommerce (B2B), companies do business with each other.  For example 
manufactures or wholesalers may be selling to retailers.  In consumer to business 
ecommerce (C2B), a consumer will make his/her requirements known and businesses 
will bid to work for the consumer.  In consumer to consumer ecommerce (C2C), 
consumers will be buying and selling to each other.  The model presented in this 
dissertation is meant for a business to consumer ecommerce market.  
2.3 Agents in Ecommerce 
Guttman and Maes [22] and He et al. [25] present a review of agents that are 
currently used, the areas in which they can be used and their benefits in ecommerce.  
According to the Consumer Buying Behavior (CBB) model which covers Business to 
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Consumer (B2C) transactions [33], there are six fundamental stages of the buying 
process.  
 Need Identification: - Buyer becomes aware of unmet need through 
advertisement of a product or through friends. 
 Product Brokering: - Evaluation of different products to determine which one 
meets the need. 
 Merchant brokering: - Evaluation of merchants based on criteria like price, 
warranty, etc specified by the buyer. 
 Negotiation: - Settling on the terms of the transaction. 
 Purchase and delivery. 
 Product service and evaluation. 
These stages are approximate and may overlap.  Software agents can be used in 
various stages of the buying process.  Agents are suited as mediators in ecommerce 
due to their personalized, continuous and autonomous nature. They can help in the 
need identifying stage, like detecting when supplies are running low.  A notification 
agent, who has the user profile, can notify the user when a good or a service that 
matches the user’s profile becomes available.  For example, in Amazon.com, the 
latest reviews of titles in categories that match the user’s interest are sent to the user.  
By using agents in the product and merchant brokering stage, search costs of the 
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consumer can be reduced.  Using techniques like feature based, constraint, and 
collaborative filtering, products that match the needs of a user can be recommended.   
In the merchant brokering stage, agents can help in finding the appropriate merchant 
to buy the product from.  For example, in BargainFinder [30], if a customer wants to 
buy a music CD, the agent searches a predefined list of CD sellers to select the CD 
with the lowest price.  Price may not be the only attribute for the user; other attributes 
can be warranty, delivery and gift services.  Shopbot [14] is a comparison price 
shopping agent.  Given the URL of a vendor site, it learns to extract information 
during the learning period.  In the comparison phase, based on knowledge gained 
during the learning phase, it is able to shop for prices at different vendor sites.  
Negotiation is the process of settling for terms and conditions under which the desired 
product will be purchased and delivered to the customer.  Most business to business 
transactions involve negotiation while most retail sales are fixed price.  Automated 
negotiations can be auctions or bilateral negotiations.  In an auction, there is an 
auctioneer agent who initiates the auction, and bidder agents then make bids 
according to the bidding protocol.  The outcome of the auction is a deal between the 
auctioneer and the successful bidder.  In the digital world many of the impediments 
that exist in real world auctions (geographical co-location, time expenditure, 
frustration for the average consumer) disappear.  In a bilateral negotiation, the 
supplier and consumer come to an agreement over the terms of the trade, and the 
contract is usually multi attributed covering price, quantity delivery date, etc.  There 
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is no fixed negotiation strategy; different strategies work in different contexts.  He et 
al. classify the existing work on negotiation in three categories [25]:  
  Making decisions by explicitly reasoning about the opponent’s behavior.  
  Making decisions by finding the current best solution. 
  Making decisions by arguing over and above the basic terms of the contract. 
 Use of agent technologies in various stages of the buying process helps combat 
information overload, expedite several stages of buying process, and reduce 
transaction costs. 
In the context of CBB model, the proposal presented in this paper encompasses the 
stages from merchant brokering to service and evaluation.  The model proposed uses 
the reputation of sellers along with the prices quoted to choose a seller in an open, 
uncertain and dynamic market.  The goal is to maximize the buyer’s profit and avoid 
dishonest sellers.  The negotiation strategy utilized is to find the current best solution.  
A seller is evaluated on the product quality and assigned a reputation rating.  
Reputation of sellers based on direct experiences is exchanged with friends in order to 
avoid dishonest sellers. 
2.3.1 Kasbah 
Kasbah [8] was one of the first models of ecommerce marketplace where buying and 
selling was automated.  Users created buying and selling agents which autonomously 
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negotiated and tried to make the best deal on their behalf.  The marketplace matched 
the sellers with the buyers.  A user created a selling agent giving it the description of 
the item to sell, the desired price to sell the item, the desired date by which to sell the 
item, the lowest acceptable price for the item, and the decay function to reduce the 
price (linear, quadratic or cubic) for the item.  User could also specify whether user 
approval was needed before finalizing the deal, and whether to send an email 
notification when the deal was completed.  The buying agent was created with the 
description of the item to buy, the date by which to buy the item, the desired price to 
pay for the item, the highest acceptable price to pay for the item, and the function to 
raise the price (linear, quadratic or cubic) for the item.  Similar to the selling agent, it 
could be specified whether user approval was needed before finalizing the deal, and 
whether to send the user an email notification.   
 The goal for the buyer agent was to find a seller who was offering the product at the 
lowest price within a time limit.  Seller agents tried to sell their products at the 
highest price they could sell within a time limit, and they reduced the price of their 
product with passage of time.  Buyer and seller agents autonomously negotiated with 
each other and tried to make the best deal on behalf of their user.  Once transaction 
was approved, humans took over to transfer cash and goods.  
The main advantage of Kasbah was that agents were autonomous; they relieved the 
user from the process of finding sellers and negotiating with them.  The authors 
pointed out that people are shy of talking to strangers, and their model provided a way 
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for users to avoid it.  A buyer agent when choosing a seller agent just focused on the 
price quoted by the selling agent.  It did not consider the quality the selling agent may 
have provided them in the past.  In this model, agents did not learn from their 
experiences, as the seller agent’s previous history with the buyer agent or the 
reputation of the seller agent was not considered.  If the seller agents or buyer agents 
were dishonest, this model could not identify them.  Dishonest agents could be 
chosen again for interaction in the next episode, if they were offering a price that 
maximized the utility for the buyer agent or the seller agent.  
2.3.2 Equlibria Strategies 
Goldman et al. develop strategies for buyers and sellers in electronic markets where 
there are stock shortages [18].  They consider a market where all sellers sell the same 
type of good, where each seller sells the same quality product at the same price, and 
each seller has same units of the product.  Buyers and sellers engage in a sequence of 
encounters.  At the beginning of each encounter, the size of stock for each seller is 
identical.  Each buyer is associated with a purchase order and a type which is the 
average amount of goods that it attempts to purchase in each encounter.  A buyer 
submits its purchase order to only one of the sellers.  A seller can sell part, all, or 
nothing of the amount in the purchase order.  Seller’s utility increases with the overall 
units sold and decreases with the units left unsold.  Buyer’s utility increases with the 
number of purchase orders satisfied.  Seller can buy information about the buyer’s 
type.  There are two types of buyers: recognizable buyers whose type information can 
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be used in future encounters, and unrecognizable buyers whose type information can 
be used only in the encounter it was obtained.  Each buyer is associated with only one 
purchase order and it is valid only for that encounter.  The authors develop a 
representative set of strategies for buyers and sellers and study which profiles are in 
experimental equilibrium.  A profile is a sequence of strategies, one for each buyer 
and one for each seller.  Seller strategies are based on arrival time of the order, size of 
the order and type of buyer, if the information is available to the seller.  Buyer 
strategies for choosing a seller are based on satisfaction with a seller in the previous 
encounter.  
The strategies developed in [18] are suitable for markets where the buyer is assured of 
the product quality and fairness in price when choosing any seller in the market, and 
the buyer’s only concern is to get its entire purchase order fulfilled.  Our focus is to 
develop buyer strategies for electronic markets where price and quality vary across 
sellers, sellers may be dishonest, behavior of sellers may change any time, and seller 
quotes a price to the buyer only if it can supply the product to the buyer. 
2.3.3 Recursive Agent Model 
Vidal and Durfeee [53] investigated when agents should act strategically by modeling 
other agents, or act as simple price takers in an economic multi-agent system.  They 
consider an economy like the University of Michigan Digital Library, where 
information goods are bought and sold.  Because the information economy is rooted 
in a delivery medium such as the internet, it is virtually free to reproduce the 
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information, there is no shortage of supply, and all agents have direct access to all 
other agents.  The authors point out that agent can survive in such an economy by 
providing value added services to meet customer’s demands. 
Their economic model consists of seller and buyer agents.  When a buyer agent wants 
to buy a good, it advertises by requesting for bids.  Sellers who have the goods send 
in their bid.  Buyer selects a seller and purchases the good at price p.  Buyer can 
evaluate the quality of a good only after receiving it.  Buyer has a valuation function v 
for each good it wishes to buy; v is a function of price and quality and returns the true 
value of the product purchased.  Buyer’s goal is to maximize its product valuation for 
the transaction.  Seller has a selling price and a cost price for a good.  The difference 
of the two is the profit for the seller.  Seller’s goal is to maximize its profit. 
Agents are divided into different classes based on their modeling capabilities.  0-level 
agents base their actions on inputs and rewards received, and are not aware that other 
agents are out there.  1-level agents are aware that there are other agents out there, 
and they make their predictions based on the previous actions of other agents.  2-level 
agents model the beliefs and intentions of other agents.  0-level agents use 
reinforcement learning.  Agents get some input, take an action and receive a reward.  
With some probability they explore instead of exploiting the marketplace, and this 
probability is initially set to 1 and reduced to a minimum value later on.  Buyer has a 
function f for each good that returns the value that the buyer expects to get by 
purchasing the good at price p.  This expected value function is learnt using 
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reinforcement learning as  f = f+α(ν–f) where α is the learning rate, initially set to 1 
and reduced slowly to minimum value.  Buyer picks a seller that maximizes its 
expected value function f.  Seller has a function h that returns the expected profit by 
selling a good at a price p.  Seller picks a price that will yield the maximum expected 
profit h.  p is the actual profit and it is the difference between the selling price and the 
cost price if a bid is made, and 0 if no bid is made.   Function h is learned by 
reinforcement learning as h = h+α(p–h). 
 1-level buyer stores the history of the last n product qualities sold by seller s.  It has a 
probability density function to calculate the quality to expect from seller s for good g.  
It uses this quality calculated in computing its expected value function.  1-level seller 
remembers the last n prices where its bid was accepted by a buyer.  It has a 
probability function to compute the average price that will be accepted by the seller.  
Seller also maintains a history of what prices were bid by other sellers.  It uses both of 
these to decide at what price to bid.  
2-level buyers do not keep deeper models of other buyers or sellers.  2-level sellers 
model other sellers as 1-level sellers.  2-level sellers first consider what bid the other 
sellers will make.   From these they model which bid the buyer will choose.  They 
then consider what bids they can make to win against the best bid.  From their 
possible bid prices they pick a bid that will yield the highest profit for them. 
The main problem addressed in this work is to determine when the agent benefits 
from having deeper models of others.  Their conclusions from the experiments were 
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that, in general, agents having deeper models did better.  However, associated with 
deeper models is the computational complexity and there should be a level at which 
the gains and the costs of having deeper models balance out for each agent.  
Our market model is meant for B2C ecommerce market and considers the existence 
of dishonest sellers in the market.  Buyers use the reputation of sellers to avoid 
dishonest sellers and reduce their risks of purchasing low quality goods.  Reputation 
of sellers is learnt based on direct interactions and also from information provided by 
trusted friends.  Who can be trusted is learnt, over a period of time, before using the 
information provided by them in making judgments about sellers.  In terms of their 0-
1-2 agent model, our buyer is a 1-level buyer, as it makes its decisions based on past 
behavior of other agents.  
2.4 Trust and Reputation Models 
When agents do not have complete information about their environment or their 
interaction partners, there is uncertainty.  Trust helps in reducing uncertainty in 
interactions in open distributed systems.  Ramchurn et. al. [37] examine the role of 
trust in multi agent systems.  They conceptualize trust in two ways; system level and 
individual level trust.  System level trust forces agents in the system to be trustworthy 
because of protocols and mechanisms that regulate the system.  Individual level trust 
models give agents the ability to reason about the trustworthiness of their interaction 
partners.  They state that system level trust can be enforced by designing interaction 
protocols that force participants to be truthful [44], or develop reputation mechanisms 
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[12, 29, and 61] that encourage interaction partners to behave in a trustworthy 
manner, or have security mechanisms [19, 35] that guarantee that new participants are 
trustworthy.  
In [43], Sabater and Sierra provide a review of several computational trust and 
reputational models.  They classify trust and reputation models on the following 
dimensions.  
1. Conceptual Model: Based on their conceptual model, trust and reputation 
models are classified as cognitive models or game theoretical models.  In 
cognitive models trust and reputation are considered to be the result of an 
agent’s mental state in a cognitive sense [7].  Esfiandiari and Chandrashakeran 
[15] point out that in cognitive models “trust and reputation are made up of 
underlying beliefs and are a function of the degree of these beliefs.”  In game 
theoretical models trust and reputation models are the result of pragmatic 
games with utility functions, and numerical aggregation of past interactions 
[1, 6, and 34]. 
2. Information sources: Trust and reputation models are classified based on the 
information sources used to compute trust and reputation.  Four types of 
information sources are considered: 
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 Direct Experiences: There are two types of direct experiences.  An 
agent’s own experience with another agent [34, 42, and 61] and an 
agent’s direct observation of other agents interactions [45, 46].  
 Witness Information: Information is provided to the agent by other 
members of the community [6, 61].  
 Sociological Information: This is based on the social relations between 
the agents, and the agents’ roles in the society [41, 42].  Examples of 
social relations can be trade, competition, and collaboration.  The roles 
of agents and their relationships with other agents influence their 
behavior and their interaction with other agents. 
 Prejudice: This is based on assigning reputation to an individual based 
on signs that identify the individual as a member of a group. Work 
described in [15, 42] uses this source of information in trust and 
reputation models. 
3. Visibility types: Models are classified based on whether trust and reputation is 
considered a global property that is shared by all individuals, or a subjective 
property that is computed separately by each individual.  In the first case, trust 
or reputation of an individual is updated at a central place.  It is computed 
from the opinions of all individuals that have interacted with the individual 
that is being evaluated.  When reputation is treated as a global property, there 
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is a lack of personalization, since it assumes a common way of thinking.  In 
[6, 56, 57, and 61] reputation is updated at a central place.  In the second case, 
each individual assesses another individual separately based on its own 
interactions, or based on information gathered from friends or other sources.  
The work described in [1, 7, 34, 42, 45, 46, 59, and 61] considers trust and 
reputation as a subjective property. 
4. Model’s granularity: In this dimension, models are classified based on 
whether trust and reputation is considered as context dependant or as non 
context dependant.  In a non-context dependant model the trust/reputation 
value for an individual is a single value [6, 45, 46, and 61].  In a context 
dependant model the trust/reputation for an individual has different values, 
one for each context [1, 7, 15, 34, and 42].  For example in a non-context 
dependant model, the reputation of a seller will be a single value.  In a context 
dependant model, the reputation of a seller can have different values for 
different contexts like price, quality and delivery date. 
5. Agent behavior assumption: There are three different levels of models based 
on the agent’s capacity to deal with cheating agents.  
 Level 0: The model does not consider cheating behavior [6, 59, 15, 
and 61]. 
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 Level 1: The model assumes that agents can hide or bias the 
information, but not lie [45]. 
 Level 2: This model assumes that agents can lie and have mechanisms 
to deal with it [42, 46]. 
6. Type of exchanged information:  Models are classified on whether they 
assume boolean information, or continuous measures.  Models that use 
probabilistic methods work with boolean information [1, 46], while models 
using aggregation mechanisms use continuous measures [6, 34, 42, 45]. 
7. Trust/reputation reliability measure: Models are classified based on whether 
the trust/reputation models provide the reliability of the trust/reputation values 
being computed.  Number of experiences, reliability of the witnesses, and age 
of the information are used to compute the trust/reputation reliability measure 
[5, 42, and 61]. 
Our model uses aspects of classifying trust and reputation models, and is conceptually 
a game theoretical model, that uses direct experiences and witness information, 
considers reputation/trust as a subjective property, considers reputation/trust to be a 
single context as it is specifically designed for ecommerce market, assumes that 
agents can cheat, and information exchanged is a continuous measure.  Our model 
does not compute a separate value for the reliability of the trust value, but instead 
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incorporates the trustworthiness of the witnesses, the experience of the witness, and 
the age of the information while computing trust and reputation value. 
2.4.1 Reputation-Oriented Reinforcement Learning Agent 
Tran [49], and Tran and Cohen [50] have developed learning algorithms for buying 
and selling agents in an open, dynamic, uncertain and untrusted economic market.  
They used Vidal and Durfee’s [53] 0-level buying and selling agents which use 
reinforcement learning to maximize their utilities as described in Section 2.3.3.  They 
enhance buying agents with reputation modeling capabilities, where buyers model the 
reputation of  sellers.  The reputation value varies from -1 to 1.  A seller is considered 
reputable if the reputation is above a threshold value and considered disreputable if 
the reputation value falls below another threshold value.  Sellers with reputation 
values in between the two thresholds are considered neither reputable nor 
disreputable.  The buyer chooses to purchase from a seller from the list of reputable 
sellers.  If no reputable sellers are available, then a seller from the list of non 
disreputable sellers is chosen.  Initially a seller’s reputation is set to 0.  The seller’s 
reputation is updated based on whether the seller meets the demanded product value.  
If the seller meets or exceeds the demanded product value then the seller is 
considered cooperative and its reputation is incremented.  If the seller fails to meet 
the demanded product value then the seller is considered uncooperative and its 
reputation is decremented.  The 0-level sellers in [20] are augmented with quality 
varying capabilities along with the price.  The seller optionally varies the quality of 
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the product based on its success rate at selling a product to a buyer in order to 
maximize its profits. 
This model builds reputation slowly.  A buyer has to interact with a seller several 
times before the reputation of the seller crosses the threshold value.  As this model 
learns slowly, it is suitable to be used by buyers who are making frequent purchases.  
In our experiments we show that a buyer using our model for seller evaluation based 
on direct interactions has a superior performance than agents employing Tran and 
Cohen’s [49, 50] or Vidal and Durfee’s [53] models for frequent and infrequent 
purchases.  For frequent purchases, a buyer using our model learns much faster than 
agents employing Tran and Cohen’s or Vidal and Durfee’s model, and for infrequent 
purchases a buyer using our model has significantly higher gains than the other two 
models.  
2.4.2 Regan’s Model of indirect assessment of reputation from 
friends 
Regan et al., and Regan and Cohen in [38, 39] provide a model for assessing 
reputation information provided by friends in an environment where friends could 
provide deceptive information.  The model attempts to account for buyer subjectivity 
in opinions by partitioning friends into reputable, disreputable and neutral sets.  They 
extend the model proposed by Tran [49] to provide a system where the buyer can 
request for reputation information about sellers from friends.  Buyers from whom 
reputation information about sellers is requested are termed as advisors.  The 
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reputation of advisors is maintained and they are partitioned into reputable, 
disreputable and neutral advisors.  When there are no reputable sellers to consider for 
purchasing, the buyer requests reputable and neutral advisors for ratings of sellers it is 
unsure of and for the ratings of some sellers whose reputation is already known.  It 
uses the reputation ratings provided for known sellers to detect if there is a systematic 
difference between the advisor’s rating and its own rating.  The mean and the 
standard deviation of the difference in the ratings is computed and if the standard 
deviation is low then the advisor’s reputation rating for a seller is adjusted by the 
mean difference to produce a rating for that seller by that particular advisor.  All 
advisors for whom there is a systematic difference in the rating are identified and 
their ratings are adjusted in the manner described above.  An overall rating for a seller 
is computed from the adjusted ratings of advisors for whom there is a systematic 
difference.  A set of potential sellers is formed, from whom a seller is chosen as 
described in the Tran model [49].  After purchasing from a seller, the reputation 
ratings of the advisors are adjusted based on their predictions about the sellers.  If the 
opinion of the advisor and the buyer match, then the reputation of the advisor is 
increased.  If the opinions are in contrast then the reputation of the advisor is 
decremented.  The authors do not specify how the opinion of the friend regarding a 
seller is inferred from the numerical rating of that seller, nor have they presented any 
experimental results to justify their theoretical approach. 
Our model proposes two approaches of identifying trustworthy friends.  In one 
approach, the trusted friends’ opinions and the rating of sellers are utilized along with 
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the buyer’s own information to select a seller to purchase from.  In the second 
approach, only the trusted friends’ opinions are utilized along with the buyer’s own 
information to select a seller to purchase from. Our work shares some ideas with [38] 
and [39], in the extent that reinforcement learning is used to adapt a friend’s rating 
and in one of the approaches the mean of the differences between the friend’s rating 
and the buyer’s rating of a seller is used to adjust the friend’s rating for that seller.  
Our differences, though, are many more than the similarities: for example, we collect 
much more complex information from our buyer friends (opinion of the friends about 
the sellers, reputation value of the sellers, and the experiences of the friends with the 
sellers), we request friends’ suggestion at every transaction, a friend’s advice is 
weighted by its experience, we look at the standard deviation of the rating differences 
to assure a consistent rating system by our friend,  we combine an individual buyer’s 
rating with that of its friends so we can deal with few purchases, and our approaches 
request for recent information by specifying that friends provide information, only if 
their interaction with the seller has been after the time specified. 
2.4.3 Social Mechanism of Reputation Management 
Yu and Singh [59] propose a social mechanism of reputation management for 
electronic communities.  Agent A assigns a rating TA(B) to agent B based on, (1) its 
direct interactions, and, (2) ratings of B given by B’s neighbors and A’s rating’s of 
those neighbors.  The trust rating varies from -1 to 1 and the initial rating is 0.  The 
rating of agent B based on direct interactions is increased if it cooperates, and is 
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decreased if it does not.  A has two threshold values, wA and ΩA, where -1 < wA < ΩA 
< 1.  If the rating of B is ≥ ΩA  , then A trusts B, and if the rating of B is ≤ wA, than A 
does not trust B.  Each agent has a set of potentially changing neighbors with whom it 
may interact directly.  How an agent determines the reputation of another agent will 
depend on the testimonies of the latter’s neighbors.  If X= (A0…, AN-1, AN) is a referral 
chain from agent A0 to AN, then A0 uses the referral chain to compute its trust rating of 
N at time t (T0X (N)t) of AN  as: 
଴ܶ௑ሺܰሻ௧ ൌ ௢ܶ௑ሺ1ሻ௧ ٔ … . .ٔ ேܶିଵ௑ ሺܰሻ௧ 
 Where   is the trust propagation factor and is given by: 
ݔ ٔ ݕ ൌ ൜ݔ ൈ ݕ ݂݅ ݔ ൒ 0 ܽ݊݀ ݕ ൒ 0,െ|ݔ ൈ ݕ|݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁             
Information provided by agent N about B is weighted by the trust rating of N (which 
is computed through trust propagating mechanism) and is known as testimony E over 
referral chain and is computed as: 
ܧ஺Xሺܰሻ௧ ൌ ஺ܶ௑ሺܰሻ௧ ேܶ௑ሺܤሻ௧ 
The testimonies over different distinct referral chains are averaged and this value is  
then used to modify the trust rating of B by A that has been computed based on direct 
interactions.  There could be more than one referral chain from 0A to NA  and 
computing trust rating in the above manner using different referral chains may result 
in different and possibly conflicting values. 
In this model subjectivity in opinions and possibility in variations in trust rating 
systems is not addressed.  In our model, buyers are members of online communities 
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like online forums, blogs, and discussion boards.  Buyers request information on 
sellers from other members of the online community.  As the buyer does not know 
other members, who respond personally, it cannot assume that they are honest, or 
share similar opinions, as opinions can be subjective.  For buyers with similar 
opinions there is also no guarantee that they share the same rating systems.  Our work 
addresses issues of subjectivity in opinions and variations in the seller rating systems 
of different buyers by providing a method of identifying trustworthy friends (honest 
and of similar opinions) from all the members of community who respond with 
information on sellers. 
2.4.4 REGRET and FIRE 
REGRET [41, 42] is a model that takes individual dimension (direct interactions), 
social dimension, and hierarchical ontology structure of agents into account. 
Individual Dimension: - This is based on direct interaction between two agents.  If 
two agents A and B interact, the rating of B at time t as computed by agent A on an 
aspect (price, quality, etc.) is the weighted mean of the individual ratings, giving 
more importance to recent ratings. 
Social Dimension- According to REGRET, an individual by default inherits the 
reputation of the group it belongs to.  Also, an individual will use the experiences of 
the members of his/her group to complement his/her experiences.  Here they consider 
three types of social reputation ratings, one based on personal experience and two 
based on social experience. 
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 The reputation rating based on the personal experience of agent A with 
the members of the group to which agent B belongs on a particular aspect. 
 The reputation rating based on what the members of the group to which 
agent A belongs think about B on a particular aspect. 
 The reputation rating based what the members of group to which agent A 
belongs think about the group to which agent B belongs on a certain 
aspect. 
The reputation rating combining the individual reputation rating and the three social 
reputation ratings is defined as the weighted sum of the individual components, where 
the weight of each component is set by the user. 
Ontological Dimension: - The reputation rating computed above is based on a single 
aspect. In REGRET, reputation is considered as a multifaceted concept.  The 
ontological dimension is the combination of reputation on different aspects to 
produce a single rating.  Each agent uses an ontological structure to combine the 
ratings, and the importance of each individual rating in producing the combined 
rating is set by the agent based on its preferences.  For example, the reputation rating 
of agent B as a good seller as computed by agent A can be the weighted sum of the 
reputation rating of B for individual aspects like price, quality, and delivery date. 
REGRET gives a general framework for combining individual trust ratings, but does 
not specify how the individual interaction trust ratings are to be computed.  The 
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advantage of this model is that it takes into account the social dimension and the 
ontological dimension.  However, as researchers in [24] point out, the social 
dimension component is dependant upon the agent’s social network and the authors 
do not specify how to build and expand the social network.  The size of the agent’s 
social network determines the number of members involved in computing the social 
dimension component.  
FIRE [23, 24] is a modular trust and reputation model consisting of four main 
components: 
1. Interaction trust is the trust resulting from direct interactions between two 
agents. The direct trust component of REGRET [41, 42] is used to model this 
part.  For each interaction and term (price, quality, etc.) between two agents, A 
and B, A assigns a rating for B.  A history of past ratings is stored in the local 
database.  The trust rating for agent B for a particular term is computed as the 
weighted mean of all the ratings for that particular term in the database.  More 
importance is given to more recent ratings.  
2. Role-based trust (RT) models the trust resulting from role-based relationships 
between two agents.  Rules are used to assign RT values.  Each rule is a tuple 
specifying the roles of the agents, the term, the rating if the agents are in that 
particular role and the default level of the influence of the rule.  To compute 
RT all relevant rules between agents A and B are looked up.  RT is computed 
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as the sum of the product of the rating of the rule and the influence level of the 
rule divided by the sum of the influence levels.  
3. Witness Reputation (WR) is based on finding witnesses that have interacted 
with that particular agent.  A referral system is used to find such witnesses.  
The WR rating is computed as the weighted mean of all the ratings provided 
by witnesses.  
4. Certified Reputation (CR) are the ratings presented by the rated agent about 
itself which have been obtained from agents with whom it has interacted in 
the past.  
The overall rating is computed as the weighted mean of all the individual trust 
components.  The relative importance of each component is set by the end user.  Each 
kind of rating has a reliability rating which reflects the confidence of the trust model 
in producing that information.  Reliability rating is measured from two values: 1) The 
number of ratings that have been considered to compute a trust rating; and 2) the 
rating deviation reliability.  If the agent’s behavior is volatile then its ratings will 
vary, as reflected by the rating deviation reliability. 
Both FIRE and REGRET give a framework for combining individual trust ratings, 
but do not specify how the individual interaction trust ratings are to be computed, as 
their trust and reputation systems are designed for general open multi agent systems.  
Our model is designed for multi agent systems in an ecommerce environment and 
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provides a method for computing the direct rating of the sellers based on the buyer’s 
interaction with the sellers.  Our goal is to optimize the buyer’s performance by 
helping it choose a seller who is offering the quality it desires at the lowest price.  
Various sellers can be offering different qualities of a product at different prices.  For 
honest sellers, we expect price to be proportional to quality.  Buyers’ preferences may 
be different.  Some may be satisfied with medium quality because of their budgetary 
constraints while others may want the highest quality irrespective of the cost.  In our 
model, the seller’s ability to meet the buyer’s expectations about quality (product 
quality, delivery schedule as expected by the buyer, etc.) and the price at which the 
product was purchased in relation to price bids made by other sellers is used to 
compute the buyer’s direct rating of the sellers. 
In REGRET witnesses are obtained through the agents’ social network.  The number 
of witnesses is limited by the size of the agent’s social network.  In FIRE witnesses 
are obtained through referral system [59] and assumed to be truthful.  As mentioned 
previously, our model is designed for ecommerce domains like the internet.  It is 
common practice for online human buyers to post queries regarding products or 
vendors at various user groups to gather more information.  We extend the same 
concept for the buyer agents in our model. To find friends who can provide 
information on sellers, we consider buyers to be members of online communities like 
online forums, blogs, and discussion boards.  Buyers request other members of the 
online community for information on sellers.  As the buyer does not personally know 
other members who respond, it cannot assume that they are honest, or share similar 
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opinions, as opinions can be subjective.  For buyers with similar opinions there is also 
no guarantee that they share the same rating system.  In our work we provide methods 
for identifying trustworthy friends (honest and of similar opinions) from all the 
members of community who respond with information on sellers. In FIRE and 
REGRET, the issue of subjectivity in opinions and the possibility of variation in 
rating scales of witnesses are not addressed. 
In our work the rating of a trustworthy friend with a larger number of buying 
experiences is weighted more than a trustworthy friend whose buying experiences are 
fewer.  We do not consider role-based trust as our model is meant for B2C business 
model where normally there are no other relationships between the buyer and the 
seller other than buyer and seller.  The concepts of role-based trust and certified 
reputation could be considered in the future extensions of the model.  
2.4.5 Histos and  Sporas 
Histos and Sporas [61] are two centralized mechanisms for maintaining reputations in 
online communities and marketplaces.  
Sporas provides a global reputation value for each member in the online community.  
In Sporas, new users start with a minimum reputation value and build their reputation 
during their activities in the system.  The reputation value of a user does not fall 
below the value of a newcomer even if the user is very unreliable.  This is to prevent 
or discourage the user from leaving the system and entering with a new identity.  
After each transaction the reputation value of the user is updated by the other party to 
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reflect his/her trustworthiness in the last transaction.  Two users can rate each other 
only once.  If the users interact more often, then only the last submitted value is kept 
in the system.  This is to prevent two parties from colluding with each other and 
inflating their reputation values.  A user with high reputation values experience 
smaller change in their ratings after each update. When updating the rating of a user 
the reputation value of the user giving the rating is also taken into account. 
Histos is a more personalized system than Sporas.  In Histos different reputation 
ratings connecting the users of the system are considered.  Pair wise ratings in the 
system are represented as a directed graph, where nodes represent users and weighted 
edges represent the most recent reputation rating given by one user to another, with 
the direction pointing toward the rated user.  If a connected path exists between two 
users, A and B, then a more personalized reputation value of B can be computed for 
A.  The reputation of an agent at level L of the graph (L>0) is calculated recursively 
as a weighted mean of the rating values that agent in level L-1 gave to that agent.  
The weights are the reputations of the agent rating the target agent.  Any agent who 
has been rated directly by the agent owner of the graph has a reputation value equal to 
the rating value.  This is the base case of the recursion.  The model limits the length 
and the number of the paths that are taken into account for calculation. 
 As Histos and Sporas are centralized reputation systems in which the reputation of a 
user is updated by other parties at a central place, it is vulnerable to multi party 
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collusion.  There is no guarantee about the accuracy of the rating.  By having a single 
global rating, the subjectivity of the parties rating the user cannot be accounted for. 
Our trust and reputation model is decentralized in which each buyer agent separately 
maintains the reputation of seller agents it has interacted with.  Buyer agents 
exchange seller reputation information with each other when evaluating sellers for 
purchase decisions.  Our model addresses subjectivity in buyers’ opinions and the 
possibility of variations in buyers’ ratings of sellers. 
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Chapter 3 Model                                                                                                                  
We consider a decentralized electronic market, where agents representing sellers offer 
products, where agents representing buyers purchase the products, and where the 
quality of the product can be gauged only after receiving it from a seller.  Seller and 
buyer agents can enter and leave the market at any time, they may be deceptive, they 
may change their nature at any time, there can be any number of seller and buyer 
agents, and there can be one time or multiple transactions between them.  From this 
point onwards we refer to buyer and seller agents as buyers and sellers.  The buyer 
has a valuation for the product which is based on the quality and price of the product. 
The buyer’s goal is to purchase from a seller who will maximize its valuation of the 
product.  At the same time it wants to avoid interactions with dishonest or poor 
quality sellers in the market.   
The buyer models seller’s reputation based on its direct interactions with it.  The 
reputation of a seller reflects the seller’s ability to provide the product at the buyer’s 
expectation level, and its price compared to its competitors in the market.  It is 
common practice for online human buyers to post queries regarding products or 
vendors at various user groups to gather more information.  We extend the same 
concept for buyers in our model.  Each buyer in this model belongs to a community 
comprising of buyers. Members of the community are referred to as friends in this 
model.  While evaluating sellers for purchase decisions, the buyer requests for 
information on sellers from friends.  There is no guarantee that friends are telling the 
38 
 
truth or are using the same evaluation mechanism of sellers as this buyer. The buyer 
models its friends’ reputation to identify trustworthy friends who are honest and share 
similar opinions regarding product qualities. The buyer then calculates an aggregate 
trust rating for each seller based on an average rating of the seller computed from its 
direct interactions with that seller, and an average reputation rating of that seller 
which is computed based on the information provided by trusted friends.  An 
aggregate trust rating is used to identify reputable sellers as potential sellers, and the 
buyer chooses to purchase from a reputable seller who maximizes its product 
valuation among all potential sellers.   
The following notation is used.  Subscript represents the agent computing the rating.  
Superscript represents the agent about whom the rating is computed.   Information in 
parentheses in the superscript is the kind of rating being computed.  For example, 
every time buyer b purchases a product from seller s,  buyer b computes direct trust 
(di) rating Tbs(di) of seller s. 
An aggregate trust rating Tbs for each seller s is computed from the following 
components. 
 Average Direct Trust Rating Tbs(diavg) - This rating is computed based on direct 
interactions between buyer b and seller s.  
 Average Reputation-Based Trust Rating Tbs(avgrep) - This rating is computed based 
on reputation of s gathered from b’s  trustworthy friends. 
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3.1 Average Direct Trust Rating (Tbs(diavg))  
 Average direct trust rating  Tbs(diavg)  for seller s is computed based on  buyer b’s 
direct interactions with s.  Buyer b records a history of its transactions with  sellers as 
a tuple (s, t, p, pr, q, Tbs(di)), where s is the seller’s identification, t is the time of  the 
interaction, p is the product, pr is the price, q is the quality, and  Tbs(di) is the trust 
rating of s based on direct interaction and is computed as described below. 
 Each time  buyer b purchases from a seller s, based on the quality of the product 
received and the price paid to purchase it,  the trust rating of seller s by buyer b is 
computed as shown in equation (1). 
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Where qact is the actual quality of the product delivered by  seller s, qexp  is the highest 
quality  buyer b expects, qmin is the minimum quality expected by buyer b, pact is the 
price paid by buyer b to purchase the product from  seller s, pmin is the minimum price 
quote received, pmax is the maximum price quote received, and pavg is the average of 
the price quotes received by  buyer b for this product. 
Buyer b uses two components to calculate the trust rating of seller s: the degree to 
which the quality delivered by s is meeting b’s expectation, and the price charged by s 
in comparison to the price quotes that b has received from other sellers.  Buyer b’s 
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trust rating of a seller s is directly proportional to the ratio of the quality s delivers, to 
b’s desired quality.  If there are two sellers, s1 and s2, who offer same quality, and the 
price asked by s1 is lower than s2, then buyer b would like to give s1 a higher rating 
than s2.  To modify the trust rating of a seller based on price, b compares the price 
charged by seller s to all price quotes it has received. The trust rating of seller s is 
decreased based on how high s’s price is compared to its competitors. 
Since quality is of utmost importance, b first categorizes seller s based on whether 
quality delivered by s (qact) meets or exceeds b’s minimum quality expectation (qmin). 
Equations (1a) and (1b) are used to compute the trust rating of a seller when the 
buyer’s quality expectation criterion is met. Equation (1c) is used to compute the trust 
rating for a seller in cases where the seller fails to meet the buyer’s minimum quality 
expectation. 
Like other researchers [39, 40], we make the common assumption that it costs more 
to produce a higher quality product.  So when seller s’s quality is greater than buyer 
b’s minimum quality expectation, b compares the price charged by s to the average 
price that was quoted for the product.  If s’s price is greater than the average price 
quoted, the difference between s’s price and the average price quoted is weighed 
against the maximum price quoted for that product (part (a) of the equation (1)).  If 
s’s price is below the average price (which can happen if other sellers are trying to 
maximize their profits, or if there are too many low quality sellers), then the rating for 
s is computed based on its quality alone (part (b) of equation (1)). 
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When seller s fails to deliver b’s minimum quality expectation, b wants to give very 
low rating to s.  So, the difference of s’s price and the minimum price quoted amongst 
various sellers is weighted against the difference between the maximum and 
minimum prices quoted to penalize the seller severely (part (c) of the equation (1)). 
This model makes two assumptions: 
  When quality delivered by a seller is higher than buyer’s highest quality 
expectation, then buyer regards the seller as meeting its highest quality 
expectations.  In other words, if qact  > qexp , qact is set as equal to  qexp . 
 It costs more to produce higher quality products.   
Tbs(di) ranges from -1 to 1.  In the best case, b gets the expected quality at the lowest 
price and Tbs(dimax) = 1 (equation 1b).  In the worst case, qact = 0; b pays the maximum 
price quoted and Tbs(dimin) = -1 (equation 1c).   
Whenever buyer b is evaluating a list of sellers for purchasing decisions, it computes 
Tbs(diavg), the average rating for each seller s from its past interactions.  Tbs(diavg)  is 
computed as the weighted mean of its past n recent interactions with s. 
௕ܶ
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௦ሺௗ௜ሻ௡௜ୀଵ
∑ ݓ௜௡௜ୀଵ  
(2)
Where Tb(i)s(di) is the rating computed for a direct interaction using equation (1).  
Subscript i indicates the ith interaction, and wi is the importance of the rating in 
computing the average and computed as:  
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Recent ratings should have more importance.  Hence the weight of a rating is 
inversely proportional to the difference between time ti  a transaction happened to the 
current time tcur.  Buyer b has threshold values θ and ω for direct trust ratings to 
indicate its satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a seller respectively.   Threshold values 
θ and ω are set by the buyer b, θ > ω, and θ and ω are in the range [-1, 1].  Buyer b 
partitions the sellers into reputable SR, disreputable SDR and neutral S? seller 
categories.   If S is the list of sellers, then the criteria for a seller to belong to one of 
the categories is: 
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, 
ܵ ൌ ܵோ ׫ ܵ஽ோ ׫ ܵ?, 
ܵோ ת ܵ஽ோ ൌ 0, ܵோ ת ܵ? ൌ 0, ܵ஽ோ ת ܵ? ൌ 0, 
 (4)
Sellers are considered reputable if their average direct trust rating Tbs(diavg) ≥ θ, 
disreputable if the average trust rating Tbs(diavg) ≤ ω, and buyer is unsure about sellers 
whose average direct trust ratings fall between ω and θ.  Buyer b recommends sellers 
in the reputable list SR, does not recommend sellers in the disreputable list SDR, and 
expresses its uncertainty about sellers in the neutral list S? . 
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3.2 Average Reputation-Based Trust Rating (Tbs(avgrep)) 
This value is computed from the information provided by b’s trustworthy buyer 
friends who are honest and share similar opinions.   
As mentioned previously, each buyer in this model belongs to a community of 
buyers. Buyer b requests for information on sellers from members of the community.  
Members of the community are referred to as friends in this model; however, there is 
no guarantee that friends are telling the truth, or they are using the same evaluation 
mechanism of sellers as buyer b.  Hence it is important for b to identify trustworthy 
friends who are truthful and whose opinions regarding sellers are similar to b’s 
opinions. It then has a circle of trustworthy friends, that it can use in cases where it 
has no direct previous experience with a seller.  In this dissertation, two methods of 
identifying trustworthy friends are presented.  In both methods, over a period of time 
based on the opinions sent by b’s friends and its own experience with the sellers, b 
learns which of the friends can be trusted in recommending good sellers and compiles 
a list RFb of trustworthy friends.  For each friend f who responds to a request for 
information by buyer b regarding the quality of a seller, b models f’s reputation rbf  . 
The value of rbf ranges from -1 to 1 and is initially set to 0.  Each time f makes a seller 
recommendation that corresponds to the experiences of b with that same seller, its 
reputation is incremented; every time f makes an inaccurate recommendation its 
reputation is decremented. 
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3.2.1 First Approach to Identifying Trustworthy Friends 
In the first approach the process of identifying trustworthy friends works as follows:  
Buyer b compiles S?, a list of sellers, it has received bids from and requests 
information from friends regarding these sellers.  For each seller s in the list S?, b 
requests the following information from each friend f: 
 Friend f’s opinion, which is one of “recommend”, “not recommend” or 
“neutral”. 
  wfs, number of direct interactions , that f has had with  seller s . 
 A numerical rating Rfs for  seller s, where Rfs is the rating by friend f  for s. 
Buyer b stores the responses from its friends, and after b has purchased from a seller 
s, it compiles a rating for that seller as described in the section for trust based on 
direct interactions.  Next, b compares the responses of its friends to its own 
experience.  If b’s opinion and friend f’s opinion regarding s match and the reputation 
of f is below a threshold value ψ, then the reputation of f is incremented.  This 
happens in two cases:   
1) If  buyer b was happy with its own experience (considers seller s to be 
reputable) and  friend  f also had recommended  s , or,  
2)  If b was unhappy (considers s to be disreputable) and f’s opinion was also 
“not recommend”.   
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The reputation of friend f is incremented by:  
ݎ௕௙ ൌ ݎ௕௙ ൅ ߙ൫1 െ ݎ௕௙൯ ݂݅ ݎ௕௙ ൒ 0
ݎ௕௙ ൌ ݎ௕௙ ൅ ߙ൫1 ൅ ݎ௕௙൯ ݂݅ ݎ௕௙ ൏ 0
 (5)
If buyer b’s and friend f’s opinion do not match, then the reputation of  friend  f is 
decremented by: 
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Where α and β are positive and negative factors respectively and chosen by buyer b.   
Buyer b also computes Δbf(s) , the difference between friend f’s rating and its own 
rating for seller s, and stores it.  Δbf(s)  is computed as: 
∆௕௙ሺ௦ሻൌ ௕ܶ௦ሺௗ௜௔௩௚ሻ ‐ ௙ܴ௦  (7)
Where Tbs(diavg) is buyer b’s average rating for seller s based on its direct interactions 
with it, and Rfs is the friend’s  f’s rating for seller s.  To determine if friend f is 
consistent in its opinions, standard deviation, σ, of m consecutive differences, Δbf(s), 
between f’s and b’s ratings for sellers is computed as:  
σ ൌ  ඩ 1݉ ෍ቀ∆௕
௙ሺ௦ሻ െ ∆௕௙ሺ௔௩௚ሻቁ
ଶ௠
௦ୀଵ
 (8)
Where m is set by buyer b, and Δbf(avg)  is the average of m consecutive differences 
between the ratings of trusted friend f and buyer b for sellers that the buyer b has 
transacted with in the last m transactions. Δbf(avg)  is computed as: 
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If the reputation value rbf  for friend f exceeds the threshold value ψ, and if the 
standard deviation, σ, of m consecutive differences between f’s and b’s ratings is 
small and below µ,  then  friend f is added to the list of trustworthy friends RFb.   
Threshold values ψ and µ are set by the buyer.  By ensuring that the standard 
deviation is small, only a friend who is consistent in its rating mechanism is added to 
RFb.  On the other hand if the reputation of the friend no longer exceeds the threshold 
value ψ or the standard deviation increases and is no longer below µ, then the friend 
is removed from RFb.  
Buyer agent b does not only consider the recommendations of trustworthy friend 
buyers, but it also adapts the trustworthy friends’ rating to better match its own rating 
algorithm. To do so, Δbf(avg)  , the average of m consecutive differences between  
trustworthy friend f’s rating and  buyer b’s rating is used to adjust the rating of a 
seller from that trustworthy friend f.  The number of experiences as reported by 
trustworthy friend f is used to decide whose opinion should be weighed more (for 
example, a trustworthy friend whose opinion is based on 30 experiences should be 
weighed more than that of a trustworthy friend whose opinion is based on a single 
experience).  Tbs(avgrep) , the average rating of  seller s across trustworthy friends is 
computed as:  
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Where n is the total number of friends in RFb , and  wfs is the number of experiences 
of trustworthy friend  f with seller s, and Δbf(avg) is computed as in equation (9). 
3.2.2 Second Approach to Identifying Trustworthy Friends  
A second approach that will be examined is when the buyer utilizes only opinions and 
experiences of trusted friends regarding sellers.   In this case, the buyer only requests 
for friend’s opinions and the number of times a friend has interacted with sellers.  The 
reason for studying this approach is to determine whether it enables the buyer to 
utilize the opinions and experiences of a higher number of friends, the rationale being 
that there will be a consistent difference between a buyer’s rating and a friend’s rating 
only if the rating mechanisms of the buyer and the friend follow the same curve.  
Friends may be honest and their recommendation for a seller may be similar to the 
buyer’s, however if the difference in ratings is not constant, then their opinions will 
not be considered in the first approach.  
 In the second approach, buyer b compiles a list S? of sellers it has received bids from 
and requests information from friends regarding these sellers.  For each seller s in the 
list S?, b requests the following information from each friend f: 
 Friend f’s opinion, which is one of “recommend”, “not recommend” or 
“neutral”. 
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 The number of direct interactions wfs, that f has had with seller s. 
Buyer b stores the responses from its friends, and after b has purchased from a seller 
s, it compiles a rating for that seller as described in the section for trust based on 
direct interactions.  Next, b compares the responses of its friends to its own 
experiences.  If b’s opinion and friend f’s opinion match, and the reputation of friend f 
is below a threshold value ψ, then the reputation of friend f is incremented as given in 
equation (5). If buyer b’s and friend f’s opinions do not match, then the reputation of 
friend f is decremented as given in equation (6). 
If the reputation value rbf for friend f exceeds the threshold value ψ, then friend f is 
added to the list of trustworthy friends RFb.  Buyer b assigns a reputation rating Rfs to 
seller s based on the recommendation of trusted friend f. Rfs is assigned a value as 
shown in equation (11).  
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At this point, buyer b has determined that f is honest and has similar opinions 
regarding sellers.  So, when f recommends s, since b would recommend s only if its 
trust rating was greater than or equal to θ, b sets Rfs = θ.  Since b does not recommend 
a seller when its trust rating is less than or equal to ω, b sets Rfs = ω, when f does not 
recommend s.  When f expresses its uncertainty over s, then Rfs  is set to a value 
between ω and θ. 
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The average rating of seller s across friends is computed as:  
௕ܶ
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(12)
Where n is the total number of trusted friends in RFb, and wfs is the number of 
experiences of trusted friend f with seller s. 
3.3 Trust Rating for an Unknown Seller (Tbs(new) ) 
When buyer b cannot infer a rating for seller s based on its information or based on 
information provided by trusted friends, it classifies seller s as a new seller. 
3.4 Aggregate Seller Rating (Tbs) 
After receiving price bids from various sellers, buyer b evaluates sellers based on its 
own knowledge and information from trusted friends, and computes a net trust rating 
Tbs for each seller s.  The following scenarios are possible. 
Case1: When seller s is new to buyer b (Tbs(diavg) =0) and to its trusted friends 
(Tbs(avgrep) =0), then Tbs = 0.  
Case 2: When seller s is new to buyer b’s trusted friends (Tbs(avgrep) =0 ), but  buyer  b 
has previously purchased from seller (Tbs(diavg)≠0), then Tbs = Tbs(diavg). 
Case 3: When seller s is new to buyer b (Tbs(diavg) =0) but at least one of its trusted 
friends has purchased from  seller s in the past (Tbs(avgrep) ≠ 0), then Tbs = Tbs(avgrep). 
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 Case 4: When seller s is not new to buyer b or its trusted friends (Tbs(diavg)≠0) and 
(Tbs(avgrep) ≠ 0), then:  
௕ܶ௦ ൌ ݔ ௕ܶ௦ሺௗ௜௔௩௚ሻ ൅ ݕ ௕ܶ௦ሺ௔௩௚௥௘௣ሻ (13)
Where x+y=1 and the values of x and y are set by buyer b to reflect how much weight 
is to be given to each component when both are available. 
3.5 Seller Selection 
When buyer b wants to purchase a product, it requests price bids from sellers who are 
interested in selling the product.  After obtaining the price bids, buyer b then requests 
information from all its friends on all the sellers who have sent price bids.  However, 
it only utilizes information about sellers provided by trustworthy friends who are in 
its trustworthy friends list RFb.  A seller is classified as new if neither the buyer nor 
any of its friends in the RFb have interacted with that seller previously.  
After computing the aggregate trust rating Tbs for each seller s, buyer b identifies a set 
of potential sellers who’s Tbs is above the satisfaction threshold θ.  Whether new 
sellers should be added to the list of potential sellers depends on the attitude of the 
buyer.  We consider two attitudes: 
1. Conservative:-This kind of buyer prefers to deal with known and reputable 
sellers, and is only willing to try out new sellers if it has not yet found good 
reputable sellers.  It explores the market more frequently in the beginning and 
occasionally at a later stage.  From the list of sellers who have sent bids, the 
buyer forms a list of sellers about whom it could not infer information based 
51 
 
on its own and its trusted friends’ experiences.  These new sellers are 
considered as unexplored, and the exploration rate is set proportional to the 
ratio of unexplored sellers to all the sellers who have sent bids.  As the 
number of unexplored sellers decreases, the exploration rate also comes down 
and is prevented from further reduction after it has reached a minimum rate. 
2. Risk Taking:- This kind of agent always includes new sellers into the list of 
potential sellers to be able to quickly identify a good seller. 
The buyer has a valuation function for the product, which is a function of the price a 
seller is quoting and the quality that has been delivered in the past.  For a seller with 
whom the buyer has interacted before, the quality is the average of the quality 
delivered in the past interactions.  For a seller with whom the buyer has not interacted 
directly, the quality is set to the desired expected quality.  From the list of potential 
sellers, the buyer chooses a seller who maximizes its product valuation function. 
3.5 Summary 
Our buyer model is designed for decentralized, open (sellers and buyers can enter and 
leave the market at any time), uncertain (quality of the product can be gauged only 
after actually seeing the product) and untrusted (sellers and buyers may be dishonest) 
electronic markets, where various sellers (honest, dishonest, overpriced, and offering 
varying quality) offer products for purchase.  The buyer’s goal is to purchase its 
desired product from a seller who will maximize its product valuation. The buyer’s 
valuation of the product is based on the quality and price of the product.   
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Each time the buyer purchases a product from a seller, it computes a trust rating for 
that seller.  It uses two components to calculate the trust rating of that seller for that 
interaction: the degree to which the quality delivered by seller is meeting buyer’s 
expectation, and, the price charged by the seller in comparison to price quotes the 
buyer has received from other sellers.  The average rating of that seller based on 
direct interactions is computed as the weighted mean of trust ratings of the buyer’s 
past interactions with the seller where the weight of a trust rating is proportional to its 
recentness. 
Each buyer in this model belongs to a community comprising of buyers who are 
referred to as friends.  While evaluating sellers for purchase decisions, the buyer 
requests for information on sellers from friends.  There is no guarantee that friends 
are telling the truth or are using the same evaluation mechanism of sellers as this 
buyer.  The buyer models its friends’ reputation to identify trustworthy friends who 
are honest and share similar opinions regarding product qualities.  
In this model we present two methods for a buyer to identify trustworthy friends.  In 
the first method, the buyer utilizes other friends’ opinions and ratings of sellers to 
identify trustworthy buyer friends.  The reputation of a seller provided by trustworthy 
friends is adjusted to account for the differences in the rating systems.  The average 
reputation rating of a seller is computed as the weighted mean of adjusted reputation 
ratings of that seller provided by trusted friends.  The weight of a rating is 
proportional to the experience of a trusted friend.  In the second method, the buyer 
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only utilizes other buyers’ opinions of sellers to identify trustworthy friends.  Ratings 
are assigned to sellers by the buyer based on trustworthy friend’s opinions.  The 
average reputation rating of a seller is computed as the weighted mean of the assigned 
ratings. 
The buyer calculates an aggregate trust rating for each seller based on the average 
rating of the seller computed from its direct interactions with that seller, and the 
average reputation rating of that seller computed based on the information provided 
by trusted friends.  The aggregate trust rating is used to identify reputable sellers as 
potential sellers.  Whether new sellers are added to the list of potential sellers depends 
on the attitude of the buyer.  A buyer with risk taking attitude includes new sellers in 
the list of potential sellers.  A buyer with conservative attitude does not include new 
sellers in the list of potential sellers, and only tries out new sellers when it wants to 
explore.  From the list of potential sellers, the buyer chooses a seller who maximizes 
its product valuation function. 
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Chapter 4 Experiments and Results                                                                                    
In this chapter, we describe the experiments conducted to evaluate our model, and we 
analyze the results. In our model: 
 We presented a method for a buyer to evaluate sellers based on its direct 
interactions. 
  We presented two methods of identifying trustworthy (honest and share 
similar opinions) friends and utilizing information from them.  
 We considered risk taking and conservative attitude of buyers. 
We tested various components of the model in five phases.  In Phase I, our goal was 
to test buyer’s method of evaluating sellers based on direct interactions.  In a market 
populated with various sellers (varying quality, honest, dishonest, and varying prices),  
we compared the performance of a buyer using our method of rating sellers based on 
direct interactions with buyers using models, for rating sellers based on direct 
interactions, proposed by other researchers.  The time taken by various buyers to 
learn to identify high quality, low priced sellers was used as a metric to compare 
various buyers.  We want buying agents to identify high quality sellers offering low 
prices as soon as possible.  If a buyer is able to identify high quality sellers quickly, 
then the buyer’s strategy can be used when making infrequent purchases.   
In Phase II, our goal was to test first method of identifying and utilizing information 
from trustworthy friends as described in section 3.2.1.  In this method, the buyer 
requests for friend’s opinions, and ratings of sellers.  The buyer uses friend’s opinions 
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and standard deviation of the differences between friends’ ratings and it’s ratings of 
sellers to identify trustworthy friends.  The reputation ratings of sellers provided by 
trustworthy friends are adjusted to account for the differences in the friends’ and the 
buyer’s rating systems and combined with the buyer’s rating of sellers to identify 
potential sellers to purchase from.  
 In Phase II, the market was populated with various sellers (varying quality, honest, 
dishonest, and varying prices) and with different types of buyer friends (honest, lying, 
similar opinions, and different opinions).  We analyzed the first method: 1) in 
successfully identifying trustworthy (honest and sharing similar opinions) friends, 2) 
utilizing the information (friend’s opinion regarding the seller and the numerical 
rating for that seller) provided by these trustworthy friends along with its own 
information regarding sellers in making purchase decisions, and, 3) determine, if the 
first method helps in improving the performance of a buyer with friends as compared 
to a buyer making decisions based on its own information.  The metrics used were: 
ability to identify trustworthy friends, time taken to identify trustworthy friends, and 
percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers at different levels of 
purchase, and as the number of sellers in the market was varied.  Desired behavior is 
that honest friends who share similar opinions are identified at the earliest and their 
information about sellers utilized all the time.  Friends who are not honest, or who do 
not share similar opinions should not be identified as trustworthy and their 
information regarding sellers should not be utilized at all.  Buyer with friends should 
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make higher percentage of purchases than buyer acting alone from honest, high 
quality sellers.  
In Phase III, we evaluate second method of identifying and utilizing information from 
trustworthy friends as described in section 3.2.2.  In this method, buyer only requests 
for friend’s opinions of sellers.  Buyer uses friend’s opinions to identify trustworthy 
friends.  Based on a trusted friend’s opinion, reputation value is assigned to a seller.  
Assigned reputation values and the buyer’s ratings of sellers are combined to identify 
potential sellers to purchase from.  In Phase III, the market was populated with 
various sellers (honest, dishonest, varying quality, and varying price) and different 
types of friends (honest, lying, sharing similar opinions, and having different 
opinions).  We compared the performances of buyers with friends using first and 
second method of identifying trustworthy friends.  Metrics were: their abilities to 
identify trustworthy friends, time taken to identify trustworthy friends, and percentage 
of purchases from honest, high quality sellers at different levels of purchase, and as 
the number of sellers in the market was varied.  Desired behavior is that honest 
friends who share similar opinions are identified at the earliest and their information 
about sellers utilized all the time.  Friends who are not honest, or who do not share 
similar opinions should not be indentified as trustworthy and their information 
regarding sellers should not be utilized at all.  We wanted to determine if any method 
(first or second) of identifying trusted friends and using information from them is 
superior. 
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 In our model, we consider two attitudes of buyers: risk taking and conservative.  A 
risk taking buyer considers new sellers (buyer has no information on these sellers) as 
reputable initially and tends to purchase from a new seller if it is offering the lowest 
price among reputable sellers.   A buyer with conservative attitude is cautious in its 
approach and explores new sellers at a rate proportional to the ratio of unexplored 
sellers to all the sellers who have sent price bids.   For phases I to III, we considered 
just one buyer attitude, as the focus was on the evaluation of the trust and reputation 
model.  As risk taking buyer is more aggressive in trying new sellers, we used risk 
taking buyers in phases I to III. 
In Phase IV, buyers with risk taking and conservative approaches are analyzed.   In 
Phase IV, the market was populated with various sellers (honest, dishonest, varying 
quality, and varying price) and different types of friends (honest, lying, sharing 
similar opinions, and having different opinions).  We compared the performances of 
risk taking and conservative buyers when they are acting alone and when they have 
friends.  Metric used was: percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers at 
different levels of purchase, and as the number of sellers in the market was varied.  
We wanted to see how attitude affects performance of buyers when they are acting 
alone and when they have friends. 
In the last phase, Phase V, we compared performances of all buyers (risk taking, 
conservative, acting alone, and with friends) at different levels of purchases, and as 
the number of sellers was varied.  We considered a market populated with various 
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sellers (honest, dishonest, varying quality, and varying price) and different types of 
friends (honest, lying, sharing similar opinions, and having different opinions).  We 
compared all buyers on the following metric: percentage of purchases from honest, 
high quality sellers at different levels of purchase, and as the number of sellers in the 
market was varied.  We wanted to see if any particular combination of buyer attitude 
and seller modeling yields the best performance. 
For our experiments we developed a simulation of an electronic market.  Figure 4.1 
provides a simplified overview of the market’s architecture.  The simulation consists 
of a Matchmaker [31], buyer agents, and seller agents, which communicate via 
KQML messages [17]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Seller agents join the market by registering with the Matchmaker, informing it of the 
products they are offering and their prices.  They also notify the Matchmaker before 
exiting the market by un-registering.  Thus, the Matchmaker has a current list of all 
Seller 
Seller 
Seller 
Matchmaker 
Buyer
Buyer 
Buyer 
Register/ 
Unregister Ask/
Tell
Ask/ 
Order/
Deliver
Friend 
Ask/ 
Tell 
Figure 4.1: Market simulation comprising of Matchmaker, buyer, and 
seller agents. 
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sellers active in the market.  Buyers send ask messages to the Matchmaker to get 
information about sellers for a certain product.  Matchmaker responds with a tell 
message containing information about all the sellers selling that product.  Buyers then 
send ask messages to sellers requesting price quotes for the product.  Upon receiving 
an order a seller responds via a deliver message which contains a value representing 
the quality of the product.  A buyer then uses the quality and the price charged by the 
seller to calculate a trust rating for the seller for that interaction.  Each buyer 
maintains a private record for all seller agents from whom it has purchased products 
in the past and utilizes this information to compute average direct trust rating as 
discussed in section 3.1 in chapter 3. 
Buyers may belong to a community comprising of buyers.  Members of the 
community are referred to as friends.  While evaluating sellers for purchase decisions, 
a buyer sends ask messages to friends requesting for seller information. Friends 
respond via tell messages containing information about sellers.  For our experiment in 
Phase I, buyers do not any have friends.  For experiments in phases II to V, buyers 
belong to a community and have friends. 
All the messages exchanged between agents have the following format: 
action from  to  sender-type  ontology  content 
Action specifies the nature of message and it can be ask, tell, deliver, order, register, 
and unregister.  From specifies message sender’s id.  To specifies the recipient of 
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message.  Sender-type specifies whether sender is a seller, buyer or matchmaker. 
Ontology specifies how the content field of message is to be interpreted.  Content 
gives the actual content of message. 
For example, when seller S1 enters the market and wants buyers to be aware of it as a 
seller for products P1 and P2, it sends a register message to Matchmaker M1.  
register S1 M1 seller default P1 P2 
When seller S1 want to leave the market it sends an unregister message to M1. 
unregister S1 M1 seller default P1 P2 
When buyer B1 wants to get a list of sellers selling product P1, it sends the following 
ask message to M1. 
ask B1 M1 buyer seller-list P1 
Matchmaker responds by sending a tell message with list of sellers (S1, S3, S7) 
selling product P1. 
 tell M1 B1 matchmaker seller-list S1 S3 S7 
The following message is an example of buyer B1 requesting for a price quote from 
seller S1 for product P1. 
ask B1 S1 buyer price P1 
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Seller S1 responds by sending a tell message which contains price. 
tell S1 B1 seller price P1 45 
In the following message, buyer B1 places an order for product P1 with seller S1. 
order B1 S1 buyer default P1 
In the following message, seller S1 delivers product P1 of quality 47 to buyer B1 
deliver S1 B1 seller default 47 
Buyer B1 requests for seller information on sellers S1, S3 and S7 from buyer B2 by 
sending the following ask message:  
ask B1 B2 buyer seller-reputation S1 S3 S7 
Buyer B2 responds with the following tell message: 
tell B2 B1 buyer seller-reputation S1 recommend 0.8 34 S3 neutral 0 0  S7 
notrecommend  0.1 5 
4.1 Phase I 
Our aim in Phase I was to compare the performance of our model of rating sellers 
based on direct interactions with other seller evaluating strategies, based only on 
direct interactions that have been proposed for this kind of market. 
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In our experiment, we compared the performances of four buyers.  All four buyers 
make decisions regarding sellers based on their own experiences and do not have any 
friend buyers. 
1. Risk Buyer: - This buyer uses our direct trust rating model for evaluating 
sellers as described in section 3.1 in chapter 3 and has risk taking attitude.  
2. Tran Buyer: - This buyer uses buying strategy as described in Tran and Cohen 
[49, 50] and summarized in section 2.4.1 in chapter 2. 
3. RL Buyer: - This buyer uses a reinforcement learning strategy as described for 
0-level buying agent in Vidal and Durfee [53] and summarized in 2.3.3 in 
chapter 2.  
4. Random Buyer: - This buyer chooses a seller randomly.  
For all buyers, we set buyers’ product valuation function as 3 * quality – price to 
reflect that high quality is buyers’ first preference.  A buyer’s product valuation 
function reflects the gain a buyer makes from having purchased a product from a 
seller.  The range of quality q sold across sellers was randomly set from 10 to 50 and 
varied in units of 1.  We set Risk Buyer’s and Tran Buyer’s minimum quality 
expectation to 40 to indicate that both buyers desire high quality product.  Hence 
acceptable quality for Risk Buyer and Tran Buyer is from 40 to 50 and non 
acceptable quality is from 10 to 39.   They use this to rate sellers, and sellers with 
high ratings are identified as potential sellers.  A potential seller who maximizes 
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product valuation is then chosen as seller to purchase from.  RL Buyer and Random 
Buyer do not have a minimum quality expectation.  RL Buyer chooses a seller who 
maximizes its product valuation, and Random Buyer chooses a seller randomly. 
Price, pr, of a product for honest sellers was set to q ± 10%q.  Like Tran [49], we 
make the assumption that it costs more to produce high quality goods.  We also make 
a reasonable assumption that seller may offer a discount to attract buyers in the 
market or raise its price slightly to increase its profits.  Hence price charged by an 
honest seller was set from 90% to 110% of product quality.  Dishonest sellers   charge 
higher prices.  To compare various buyers, we populated the market with sellers 
offering different qualities at various prices.  Based on quality delivered, price 
charged, and nature of sellers we considered the following six categories of sellers: 
1. Honest Acceptable (HA): - Each seller offers quality in the buyer’s acceptable 
range [40, 50].  Their price is from 90% to110% of the quality they are 
selling.   
2. Honest Not Acceptable (HNA): - Each seller offers a quality in the buyer’s 
unacceptable range [10, 39].  Their price is from 90% to110% of the quality 
they are selling.   
3. Overpriced Acceptable (OPA):- Each seller offers quality in the buyer’s 
acceptable range [40, 50].  Their price is from 111% to 200% of the quality 
they are selling.   
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4. Overpriced Not Acceptable (OPNA): - Each seller offers quality in the buyer’s 
unacceptable range [10, 39].  Their price is from 111% to 200% of the quality 
they are selling.  
5. Inconsistent: - Each seller offers quality in the range [10, 50].  Their price is 
from 90% to 110% of the quality they are selling.  
6. Dishonest: - This category of sellers in their first sale to a buyer offer 
acceptable quality q [40, 50] charging a price pr= q ± 10%q.  In their 
subsequent sales to that buyer they reduce the quality q to be in the range [10, 
25].  However their price still remains high, by setting it to pr= q1 ± 10%q1 
where q1 is in the range [40, 50]. 
Table 4.1 lists various seller categories along with their price and quality 
characteristics. 
Table 4.1: Seller quality and price configuration 
Seller Category Quality q Price 
Honest Acceptable 40-50 (0.9-1.1) * q 
Honest Not Acceptable 10-39 (0.9-1.1) * q 
Overpriced Acceptable 40-50 (1.11-2.00) * q 
Overpriced Not Acceptable 10-39 (1.11-2.00) * q 
Inconsistent  10-50 (0.9-1.1) * q 
Dishonest  
 First Sale 
 Subsequent Sales 
 
 qfirst = 40-50 
 10-25 
 
(0.9-1.1) * qfirst 
(0.9-1.1) * qfirst 
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Parameters for Risk Buyer: As mentioned previously Risk Buyers’ minimum quality 
expectation was set to 40.  Risk Buyer’s desired expected quality qexp was set to 50.  
This value reflects highest quality that buyer desires and should be set to a value 
greater than or equal to the buyer’s minimum quality expectation.  As the maximum 
quality delivered by any seller is 50, maximum price pmax quoted by an honest seller 
would be 55(50+10%*50).  As the minimum quality delivered by any seller is 10, the 
minimum price pmin quoted would be 9 (10-10%10).  With an even distribution, the 
average price pavg would be 32 (pmax+pmin/2).  The threshold values θ for a seller to 
be considered reputable and ω for a seller to be considered disreputable values can be 
computed as follows: Risk Buyer is expecting at least a quality of 40.  In the worst 
case, it can get this at the highest price that can be charged by an honest seller which 
would be 44(40+10%*40).  From equation 1(a) the trust rating for that seller would 
be 
581.0
55
3244
50
40 

    
 
So we set θ = 0.58.  For new sellers trust rating is set to 0.  These buyers should not 
come under the category of disreputable sellers.  So the threshold value, ω, for a 
seller to be considered unacceptable should be less than 0 and we set it as -0.1. 
Parameters for Tran Buyer: We set this buyer’s minimum quality expectation to 40, 
same as Risk Buyer’s minimum quality expectation.  The threshold for a seller to be 
considered reputable is set to 0.5 and for a seller to be considered disreputable is set 
to     -0.9 as described in their work. 
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RL Buyer and Random Buyer do not have specific parameters to be set.  RL Buyer 
chooses a seller who maximizes its product valuation, and Random Buyer chooses a 
seller randomly. 
We wanted the market to have at least one seller from each seller category shown in 
table 4.1.  To keep seller distribution even, we wanted the market to have equal 
number of sellers from each category.  This means the market should have 6 sellers at 
the minimum.  We populated the market with two sellers per category, a total of 12 
sellers.  In our experiment each buyer conducted 500 transactions.  As there are 12 
sellers, this should give buyers sufficient time to identify desirable sellers to purchase 
from and then consistently buy from these sellers.  In each transaction, each buyer 
purchases product p by querying the seller list from the Matchmaker, obtaining price 
quotes from different sellers and utilizing its buying strategy to choose a seller.  Data 
shown is based on the average of 100 runs of the experiment.   
In our experiment we compared the performances of various buyers on the following 
parameters: 
 How long it took them to learn to identify high quality, low priced sellers.  We 
want buyers to identify high quality sellers offering low prices as soon as 
possible.  If a buyer is able to identify high quality sellers quickly, then the 
buyer’s strategy can be used when making infrequent purchases. 
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 Average gain as the number of purchases of product p is increased.  If the 
average gain is consistently high, it means that the buyer is interacting with 
high quality sellers offering low prices most often.  If the average gain is high 
earlier on, it implies that buyer has identified high quality low price sellers 
quickly. 
Figures 4.2 - 4.5 show gain versus transactions for each type of buyer. 
 
Figure 4.2: Gain versus transactions for Risk Buyer. 
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Figure 4.3: Gain versus transactions for Tran Buyer. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Gain versus transactions for RL Buyer. 
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Figure 4.5: Gain versus transactions for Random Buyer. 
Table 4.2 shows the number of purchases made by a buyer from each seller type.  
Table 4.2: Buyer-seller interactions 
 HA HNA OPA OPNA INC DIS 
Risk Buyer 488 2 2 2 2 4 
Tran Buyer 451 7 23 5 8 6 
RL Buyer 420 16 15 13 17 16 
Random Buyer 86 88 82 83 69 92 
Acceptable quality sellers can offer qualities anywhere from 40 to 50.  The lowest 
gain from purchasing from an honest seller offering at the lowest end of good quality 
range and charging its highest price is 76 (3*40 – 44).  When the gain from 
purchasing from a seller is 76 and above, it means the buyer is purchasing from a 
high quality low priced seller.  From figures 4.2-4.5, it can be seen that Risk Buyer, 
Tran Buyer, and RL Buyer learn at different rates to identify high quality, low priced 
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sellers.  After having learnt, they consistently interact with high quality, low priced 
sellers.  This is confirmed by the fact that highest number of purchases are made from 
honest acceptable sellers as shown in table 4.2.  Random Buyer never learns and that 
is to be expected as it is   choosing sellers randomly.  Risk Buyer learns to identify 
high quality low priced sellers very quickly in about 15 transactions or purchases, 
Tran Buyer takes about 60 transactions to learn, and RL Buyer learns in about 250 
transactions.  If the buyers were to purchase the product infrequently then our model 
would work better than RL Buyer’s or Tran Buyer’s strategy as it requires the least 
number of transactions to learn.  
Figure 4.6 shows average gain versus the number of purchases for different buyers. 
 
Figure 4.6: Average gain versus number of purchases for different buyers. 
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In the beginning, average gains are fluctuating as buyers employing a non-random 
strategy are learning and Random Buyer is choosing sellers randomly.   Risk Buyer is 
the quickest to learn and its average gain raises sharply earlier on compared to the 
other two learning agents.   As RL Buyer takes a long time to learn, its average gain 
at the end is still lower than the Risk Buyer’s or Tran Buyer’s.  Since Random Buyer 
purchases randomly from various types of sellers, its average is consistently the 
lowest.  In the first half of figure 4.6 it can be seen that when purchases are fewer, 
average gain for Risk Buyer, once its learning phase is completed, is higher than other 
buyers.  So, if buyers were to purchase a product infrequently, then our model works 
better than RL Buyer’s or Tran Buyer’s strategies.  As the number of purchases 
increases, Risk Buyer still has the highest average gain with Tran Buyer’s average 
gain coming very close to it at very high number of purchases.  
4.2 Experimental setup for Phases II, III, IV, and V 
In Phase II, our aim was to analyze the first method of identifying friends presented in 
this dissertation.  In Phase III, we wanted to compare the first and second method of 
identifying friends.  In Phase IV, we wanted to study risk and conservative attitudes 
of buyers, and in Phase V, we wanted to see if any particular combination of buyer 
attitude and modeling of sellers yields the best performance.  In the electronic market 
simulation shown in figure 4.1, we populated the market with:  
 sellers of different nature (honest, dishonest, and inconsistent) selling different 
qualities (high, medium, and  low) at different prices, 
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 buyers with different attitudes (risk taking and conservative) either acting 
alone , or  with friends utilizing one of the methods of identifying friends,  
 honest friend buyers who either share same opinions, or have slightly different 
opinions, or very different opinions, and, 
 lying friend buyers.  
We conducted two experiments and analyzed the performance of various buyers in 
different phases.  The following sections describe the sellers, buyers, friend buyers 
and the experiments in detail. 
4.2.1 Sellers 
Similar to our settings in Phase I, for our experiments in Phase II, sellers sell a single 
product and its quality q ranges from 10 to 50 and varies in units of one.  We 
categorized quality into three ranges: high (40-50), medium (25-39) and low (10-24).  
In Phase I, we had categorized quality in acceptable and unacceptable ranges.  Here 
we categorized them into three ranges because we wanted to simulate buyers with 
different opinions regarding sellers.  Similar to our settings in Phase I, for our 
experiments in Phase II, the price charged for a product by a seller depends on the 
nature of that seller; this can be honest, dishonest, inconsistent, or overcharging.  Like 
Tran [49, 50], we make the assumption that it costs more to produce high quality 
goods and that the seller may offer a discount to attract buyers in the market or raise 
its price slightly to increase its profits.  Hence the price of the product is set in the 
range of 90% to110% of the quality value for an honest seller.  Overpriced sellers 
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charge 111% to 200% of the quality value.  Each honest seller offers the product in 
any one quality category.  Dishonest sellers offer high quality products and charge an 
honest seller’s price in their first transaction with a buyer; subsequently, they reduce 
the quality by 50%, but continue to charge the same price.  Inconsistent sellers sell 
high, medium and low quality products randomly and charge honestly.  For our 
experiments, we considered sellers belonging to one of the following eight categories 
created by different combinations of seller nature and quality ranges with price and 
quality values as shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: Seller quality and price configuration 
Seller Category 
(Nature Quality) 
Quality q Price 
Honest High 40-50 (0.9-1.1) * q 
Honest Medium 25-39 (0.9-1.1) * q 
Honest Low 10-24 (0.9-1.1) * q 
Overpriced High 40-50 (1.11-2.00) * q 
Overpriced Medium 25-39 (1.11-2.00) * q 
Overpriced Low  10-24 (1.11-2.00) * q 
Inconsistent  10-50 (0.9-1.1) * q 
Dishonest  
 First Sale 
 Subsequent Sales 
 
 qfirst = 40-50 
 20-25 
 
(0.9-1.1) * qfirst 
(0.9-1.1) * qfirst 
 
Similar to our settings in Phase I, for our experiments in Phase II we set the product 
valuation function to be 3*quality – price, which implies that purchasing highest 
quality product is the buyer’s first priority, and the buyer would like to purchase the 
highest quality product from a seller who is selling it at the lowest price, i.e., the 
category of sellers belonging to “Honest High”.   
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4.2.2 Buyers 
We compared the performances of the following six buyers:  
1. Risk Buyer: This buyer makes decisions regarding purchases based on its own 
experience with sellers and uses our direct trust rating model as described in 
section 3.1 in chapter 3 for evaluating sellers.  Its attitude towards new buyers 
is “Risk Taking” which means that new or unexplored buyers are always 
included in the list of potential sellers.  Similar to our settings in Phase I, this 
buyer expects a minimum quality of 40 and its desired expected quality is 50.  
The buyer’s reputation rating scale for sellers is [-1, 1].  The reputation 
threshold values θ and ω for a seller to be considered reputable and 
disreputable respectively were calculated as described in the Phase I and are 
set to 0.6 and -0.1.  This buyer’s product valuation is maximized by 
purchasing from sellers belonging to the “Honest High” category and, 
consequently, sellers from this category get the highest rating by this buyer. 
2. RiskWithFr Buyer:  A buyer with friends using our direct trust rating model 
for evaluating sellers based on direct interactions, a “Risk Taking” attitude 
towards new buyers, and using the first method of identifying trustworthy 
friends as described in section 3.2.1 in chapter 3.  This buyer uses friends’ 
opinions as well and friends’ ratings of sellers, when considering various 
sellers for purchase decisions.  The quality expectations from and reputation 
thresholds for a seller are the same as for a Risk Buyer and hence this buyer’s 
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product valuation is also maximized by purchasing from the “Honest High” 
category of sellers. 
3. OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer: A buyer with friends, using our direct trust rating 
model for evaluating sellers (section 3.1) based on direct interactions, “Risk 
Taking” attitude towards new buyers, and using the second method of 
identifying trustworthy friends as described in section 3.2.2 in chapter 3.   
This buyer considers only friends’ opinions regarding sellers when making 
decisions about sellers.  The quality expectations from and reputation 
thresholds for this seller are the same as for a RiskWithFr Buyer and hence 
this buyer’s product valuation is also maximized by purchasing from the 
“Honest High” category of sellers. 
4. Cns Buyer: This buyer makes decisions regarding purchases based on its own 
experience with sellers and uses our direct trust rating model for evaluating 
sellers.  Its attitude towards new buyers is “Conservative”.  This buyer 
purchases from new sellers during its exploration of the market.  The 
exploration rate is proportional to the ratio of new sellers to all the sellers in 
the market.  The detailed policy of a buyer with conservative attitude 
regarding new sellers is described section 3.5 of chapter 3.  The desired 
expected quality, acceptable quality limits and threshold values for θ and ω 
are the same as for Risk Buyer. 
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5. CnsWithFr Buyer: A buyer with friends using our direct trust model for 
evaluating sellers based on direct interactions, having “Conservative” attitude 
towards new buyers and using the first method of identifying trustworthy 
friends as described in section 3.2.1 in chapter 3.  The quality expectations 
from, and reputation thresholds for a seller are the same as for a Cns Buyer 
and hence this buyer’s product valuation is also maximized by purchasing 
from the “Honest High” category of sellers. 
6. OOnlyCnsWithFr Buyer: A buyer with friends using our direct trust rating 
model for evaluating sellers based on direct interactions (section 3.1), having 
“Conservative” attitude towards new buyers and using the second method of 
identifying trustworthy friends as described in section 3.2.2 in chapter 3.  The 
quality expectations from, and reputation thresholds for a seller are the same 
as for a RiskWithFr Buyer and hence this buyer’s product valuation is also 
maximized by purchasing from the “Honest High” category sellers. 
Table 4.4 lists various buyers along with their distinguishing features whose 
performances were analyzed in different phases. 
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Table 4.4: Different buyers’ characteristics 
Buyer Attitude Friends Friend Model 
Risk Buyer Risk taking None None 
RiskWithFr Buyer Risk taking Yes 
Utilize friend’s 
opinion and 
numerical rating of a 
seller  
OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer Risk taking Yes Utilize friend’s opinion of a seller 
Cns Buyer Conservative None None 
CnsWithFr  Buyer Conservative Yes 
Utilize friend’s 
opinion and 
numerical rating  of a 
seller 
OOnlyCnsWithFr Buyer Conservative Yes Utilize friend’s opinion of a seller 
In Phase I, we showed that a “Risk Buyer” has a superior performance than agents 
employing Tran’s [49] model (Tran Buyer), or Vidal and Durfee’s [53] model (RL 
Buyer) for frequent as well as for infrequent purchases. Hence we did not include 
Tran Buyer or RL Buyer in our experimental phases II-IV 
4.2.3 Friend Buyers 
We considered three categories of friends: 
4.2.3.1 Friends with similar opinions 
The first category is a group of friends who share similar opinions, but some of them 
have different seller rating systems than RiskWithFr Buyer.  All buyers belonging to 
this group have the same quality expectations as RiskWithFr Buyer; give high ratings 
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to sellers belonging to “Honest High” category and respond honestly when requested 
for information.  We considered four friends in this category: 
1. Risk Friend: This friend uses our direct trust rating model for evaluating 
sellers for direct interaction.  This friend is identical to RiskWithFr Buyer in 
its method of rating sellers based on direct interactions. 
2. CD-0.5 Friend: This friend uses a scale that is additively different from 
RiskWithFr Buyer’s scale by 0.5.  This buyer’s reputation rating scale for 
rating sellers is [-0.5, 1.5].  The CD in the buyer’s name stands for “constant 
difference”  as the difference in the reputation rating of a seller between this 
buyer and RiskWithFr Buyer is always 0.5. 
3. CM-10 Friend: This friend has a rating scale which is ten times that of the 
RiskWithFr Buyer.  This buyer’s reputation rating scale for rating sellers is [-
10, 10].  The CM in the buyer’s name stands for “constant multiple” as the 
reputation rating of a seller by this buyer is  a constant multiple (10 times) of 
the reputation rating of the same seller by RiskWithFr Buyer. 
4. N-01 Friend: This friend’s seller rating scale is [0, 1].  The N in the buyer’s 
name stands for “normalized”.  We implemented this buyer by taking  Risk 
Friend buyer, whose reputation rating scale is from -1 to 1, and normalized 
the reputation values to fit on a [0, 1] scale. 
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4.2.3.2 Friends with slightly different opinions 
Second category of friends has slightly different opinions and responds honestly 
when asked for information.  We considered two buyers in this category. 
5. SDO Friend: This buyer’s rating system for sellers is similar to RiskWithFr 
Buyer’s rating system for direct interactions; however, the quality 
expectations are slightly different.  This friend is satisfied with medium 
quality products, does not care for higher quality, and gives high rating to 
sellers belonging to the “Honest Medium” category.  Sellers belonging to 
“Honest High” category are given slightly lower ratings than sellers belonging 
to “Honest Medium” category, as this quality product is slightly more 
expensive than medium quality product.  This buyer’s reputation rating scale 
for rating sellers is [-1, 1].  SDO in the buyer’s name stands for “Slightly 
Different Opinion”. 
6. Tran Friend: This friend uses Tran’s model for evaluating sellers [49].  This 
buyer gives high ratings to sellers belonging to “Honest High’ category as its 
quality expectations are same as RiskWithFr Buyer.  This buyer’s opinions are 
slightly different as it classifies sellers as good or bad; where as RiskWithFr 
Buyer classifies sellers as good, neutral, and bad.  This buyer’s reputation 
rating scale for rating sellers is [-1, 1]. 
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4.2.3.3 Friends with very different opinions 
This category of friends has very different opinions, but is honest when responding to 
information requests.  We considered one friend in this category. 
7. VDO Friend: This friend is satisfied with low quality sellers and does not care 
for quality to be greater than 24, which is the upper bound of the low quality 
range.  It gives sellers belonging to “Honest Low” category high ratings.  
Sellers belonging to “Honest Medium” category are given slightly lower 
ratings than sellers belonging to “Honest Low” category, as they are 
considered slightly expensive, and sellers belonging to “Honest High” 
category are given low ratings as they charge higher prices.  Sellers belonging 
to “Honest Low” and sometimes “Honest Medium” quality categories are 
considered as good sellers.  Sellers belonging to “Honest High” quality 
category are not considered as good sellers, and this friend does not 
recommend this category of sellers.  VDO in the buyer’s name stands for 
“Very Different Opinion”.  This buyer’s reputation rating scale for rating 
sellers is [-1, 1]. 
4.2.3.4 Lying friends 
These types of friends are not honest when responding to information request. We 
considered one friend in this category. 
8. Erratic Friend: This buyer’s rating system for sellers is similar to RiskWithFr 
Buyer’s rating system for direct interactions.  Its reputation rating scale is [-1, 
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1].  Replies from this friend to an information request are erratic.  The 
reputation of the sellers is provided truthfully and incorrectly on a random 
basis.  
Table 4.5 summarizes the various types of friends we considered. 
Table 4.5: Friends’ characteristics 
Friend Buyer Direct Interaction Model Opinion Similarity Honesty Rating Scale
Risk  Friend Our direct trust rating model Very Similar Honest [-1,1] 
CD-0.5 Friend Our direct trust rating model Very Similar Honest [-0.5, 0.5] 
CM-10 Friend Our direct trust rating model Very Similar Honest [-10, 10] 
N-01 Friend Our direct trust rating model Very Similar Honest [0, 1] 
SDO Friend Our direct trust rating model Slightly different Honest [-1, 1] 
Tran Friend Tran’s Model Slightly different Honest [-1, 1] 
VDO Friend Our direct trust rating model Very different Honest [-1, 1] 
Erratic Friend Our direct trust rating model Very Similar Lying [-1, 1] 
4.2.4 Parameters 
The threshold value ψ for a friend to be considered reputable was set to 0.6, the exact 
value as θ, the reputation threshold value for a seller to be considered reputable.  We 
set the value of α and β to be 0.2 and -0.6 respectively (see equations (5, 6)).  When α 
> 0.5, a friend’s reputation value can cross the threshold value within one transaction, 
which is too soon to determine a friend’s trustworthiness, reliability and opinions.  So 
α should be between [0.1, 0.5], and for a particular value of α, β > α.  The reason 
being, after becoming a trustworthy friend, if the reputation of the friend falls below 
the threshold value ψ, it should drop sufficiently that its reputation value does not 
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cross the threshold value ψ within one transaction.  Initially we set α = 0.2 and β = -
0.6 and later conducted experiments to determine the optimum range of values for α 
and β.  With α = 0.2, initially it will take at least 6 transactions for a friends’ 
reputation to exceed the threshold value and hence we set m in equations (8 and 9) to 
be 5, and the standard deviation threshold µ to be  0.15.  We set the value of x and y 
to be 0.5 each, which means the buyer, will give 50% weight to its own experiences 
and 50% weight to the opinions of its friends (see equation (13)). 
4.2.5 Experiments 
We conducted two experiments.  In experiment 1, we populated the market with 32 
sellers, with four sellers from each category in table 4.3.  We wanted to have the same 
number of sellers in each category.  Since there are eight categories, we had to 
populate the market with sellers in multiples of 8.  For our first experiment, we chose 
32 sellers and in experiment 2 we varied the number of sellers.  We populated the 
market with 14 buyers comprising of 6 buyers, one from each category in table 4.4 
and one of each type of 8 friends summarized in table 4.5.  We studied the 
performances of six buyers chosen from each category in table 4.4.  To ensure that 
the model works correctly and consistently, we conducted 100 trials and report on the 
average of 100 trials.  In each trial, the buyers made 500 purchases or transactions 
with sellers.  500 transactions would give buyers ample time to learn and purchase 
from high quality, low priced sellers constantly.  In each transaction, each buyer 
obtains a registered list of sellers selling this product from the Matchmaker and sends 
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a message to each seller in the list asking them to submit their bids for the product.  
Sellers who are interested in getting the contract submit a bid which includes the 
price.  Buyers with friends then request information about sellers from each buyer 
friend.  All buyers wait for a certain amount of time for responses and then evaluate 
the bids received to choose a seller to purchase from.  We had the friends make their 
purchases first so that they could provide useful information to buyers with friends. 
In experiment 2, the buyer configuration was the same as in experiment 1.  We varied 
the number of sellers in the market and conducted 100 trials for each seller count.  
Buyers made 500 transactions in each trial.  In each transaction, the buyers made 
purchases as described in experiment 1.  As the number of sellers was increased, we 
kept the ratio of each type of seller to the total number of sellers constant.  For 
example, when the market was populated with 8 sellers, there was one seller from 
each category in Table 4.3 and when the seller count was increased to 32, there were 
4 sellers from each category. 
Using the data collected from experiment 1 and 2, the performances of various buyers 
was analyzed in different phases.  In Phase II, the first method of identifying 
trustworthy friends as described in section 3.2.1 was analyzed by studying the 
performance of RiskWithFr Buyer.  RiskWithFr Buyer considers a trusted friend’s 
opinion and rating of a seller in choosing a seller to purchase from.  In Phase III, the 
first and the second methods of identifying trusted friends were analyzed by 
comparing the performances of RiskWithFr Buyer and OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer. 
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OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer considers only trusted friends’ opinions of a seller.  In 
Phase IV, risk taking and conservative attitudes of buyers were compared and in 
Phase V all the six buyers in table 4.4 were compared.  
4.3 Phase II 
In Phase II, the first method of identifying trustworthy friends as described in section 
3.2.1 in chapter 3 was analyzed for its effectiveness 1) in successfully identifying 
trustworthy friends, and 2) utilizing the information regarding sellers (friend’s 
opinion regarding the seller and the numerical rating for that seller) provided by these 
trustworthy friends along with its own information in making purchase decisions.  We 
compared the gains of a buyer acting alone (Risk Buyer) and a buyer with friends 
(RiskWithFr Buyer) to determine if the first method presented in section 3.2.1 helps 
in improving the performance of buyer with friends as compared to a buyer making 
decisions based on its own information. 
 The experimental setup and the two experiments have been described in the previous 
section (4.2).  From the data collected from experiments 1 and 2, in this phase, we 
analyzed the performances of Risk Buyer and RiskWithFr Buyer.  Risk Buyer is a 
buyer acting alone and making decisions regarding sellers based on its own 
information.  It uses the direct trust rating model as described in section 3.1 to model 
sellers.  RiskWithFr Buyer uses our direct trust rating model for direct interactions, 
has friends, and uses the first method of identifying trustworthy friends.  In the first 
method, friends’ opinions and the ratings of sellers are used to identify trustworthy 
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friends (who are honest and share similar opinions).  Next, a buyer adjusts sellers’ 
ratings by trustworthy friends to account for the differences in the buyer’s and 
trustworthy friends’ seller rating systems and then combines them with its ratings of 
sellers to evaluate sellers for purchase decisions. 
Our first goal was to study the effectiveness of the first method of identifying 
trustworthy friends.  From the data collected for RiskWithFr Buyer in experiment 1: 
1) we looked at how many times different types of friends were identified as 
trustworthy in 100 trials, 2) in each trial, how soon was each type of friend identified 
as trustworthy, and 3) in each trial, the number of times a friend’s opinion was 
utilized out of 500 transactions.  We used these parameters for comparison because a 
friend is identified as trustworthy if the opinions of RiskWithFr Buyer and the friend 
regarding a seller match, and the standard deviation (of the differences between the 
two buyers’ ratings for a seller) is below a threshold value.  Since friends are being 
monitored continuously, how often a friend’s opinion is used will depend on the type 
of friend.  We expected friends with similar opinions (Risk Friend, CD-0.5 Friend, 
CM-10 Friend, and N-01 Friend) to be identified the earliest and their opinions to be 
utilized all the time once they are identified.  We expected friends with slightly 
different opinions (SDO Friend, and Tran Friend) also to be identified as trustworthy 
friends a little later and their opinions to be utilized.  To ensure that the model works 
correctly and consistently, we conducted 100 trials and expected similar and slightly 
different opinion friends to be identified as trustworthy in all of the trials.  Ideally, 
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VDO Friend and Erratic Friend should not be identified as trustworthy in any of the 
trials. 
The results from experiment 1 are shown in table 4.6. 
Table 4.6: Performance of buyer using first method of identifying trustworthy    
friends 
Friend 
Average transaction  
when a friend is first 
 identified as a  
trustworthy  
friend in each trial1 
Average percentage 
of 500 transactions a 
friend’s opinion is 
used in each trial. 
Percentage of trials 
identified as a 
trustworthy          
friend  in 100 trials 
Friends with similar opinions 
Risk Friend      13  96%    100% 
CD-0.5 Friend 8  96%    100% 
CM-10 Friend 39  76%    100% 
N-01 Friend 11  94%    100% 
Friends with slightly different opinions 
SDO Friend 28 84%    100% 
Tran Friend 119 72%    100% 
Friends with very different opinions 
VDO Friend 38      3%    14% 
Lying Friend 
Erratic Friend      20       0.4%    3% 
                                                 
1 A friend is identified as trustworthy only if the opinions of RiskWithFr Buyer and the friend 
regarding a seller match and the standard deviation of the differences between the buyers’ ratings for 
sellers is below a threshold value. 
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From Table 4.6 we see that friends with similar opinions were identified as 
trustworthy in all the trials, they were among the earliest to be identified as 
trustworthy, and their opinions were utilized 76% to 96% of 500 transactions. 
 SDO Friend was also identified as trustworthy in all the trials and its opinions were 
utilized in 84% of 500 transactions in each trial.  The second “slightly different” 
friend, Tran Friend, was also identified as a trustworthy friend in all the trials, and its 
opinions were utilized in 72% of 500 transactions.  It was identified as trustworthy 
significantly later than other trustworthy friends.  We think this is because Tran 
Friend classifies sellers as good and bad (whereas our model classifies sellers as 
recommend, not recommend, and no opinion) and hence it takes a longer time for 
RiskWithFr Buyer to identify Tran Friend as trustworthy. 
VDO Friend was correctly identified as untrustworthy in 86% of the trials. It was 
incorrectly identified as trustworthy in 14% of the trials; however, its opinions were 
utilized in only 3% of 500 transactions in each trial it was identified as trustworthy.  
After erroneously identifying VDO Friend as trustworthy early on, RiskWithFr Buyer 
is able to quickly realize that this friend should not be considered trustworthy and 
removes it from its trustworthy friends list.  This is reflected in the fact that the 
friend’s opinions were utilized in only 3% of 500 transactions. 
Erratic Friend, who provides information about sellers randomly, was correctly 
identified as not trustworthy in 97% of 100 trials.  In 3% of the trials, even though the 
model incorrectly identified this buyer as a trustworthy friend, RiskWithFr Buyer is 
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able to realize its mistake which is indicated by the fact that this friend’s opinion was 
utilized in just 0.4% of all 500 transactions. 
Our next goal was to determine whether a buyer with friends, utilizing the first 
method of identifying trustworthy friends, has higher performance than a buyer acting 
alone.  From the data collected in experiment 1, we compared the average percentage 
of purchases made from honest, high quality sellers by Risk Buyer and RiskWithFr 
Buyer at different levels of purchases. 
Figure 4.7 shows the average percentage of purchases made from honest, high quality 
sellers by Risk Buyer who is acting alone and RiskWithFr Buyer who is utilizing the 
opinions of friends along with its own experiences in making decisions at different 
levels of purchases, as the buyers made 500 purchases in total.  
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Figure 4.7: Percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by Risk 
Buyer and RiskWithFr Buyer versus total number of purchases with 32 sellers 
in the market. 
It can be seen in figure 4.7 that at a lower number of purchases, RiskWithFr Buyer’s 
performance is much higher than that of Risk Buyer.  Over 100 trials, in 25 
purchases,  Risk Buyer made on average  only 8% of total purchases from honest, 
high quality sellers as compared to  RiskWithFr Buyer who made 48% of total 
purchases from honest, high quality sellers which is an improvement of 500%.  In 50 
purchases, the average percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by 
Risk Buyer was 36%, and   by RiskWithFr Buyer was 56%, an improvement of 55%.  
In 100 transactions, the average percentage of purchases from honest, high quality 
sellers by Risk Buyer was 65% and RiskWithFr Buyer was 72%, a percentage 
increase of 11%.  In 500 purchases, Risk Buyer made 93% and RiskWithFr Buyer 
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made 94% of total purchases from honest, high quality sellers.  When the buyers are 
making frequent purchases, they are in the market long enough to figure out who the 
best sellers are and then tend to purchase frequently from them.  Hence the difference 
in the performances of the buyer acting alone and a buyer with friends reduces as the 
purchase frequency increases. 
From the data collected in experiment 2, we compared the average percentage of 
purchases made from honest, high quality sellers in 50 purchases, by Risk Buyer and 
RiskWithFr Buyer, as the number of sellers was varied.  Figure 4.8 shows the average 
percentage of purchases made from honest, high quality sellers in 50 purchases by 
Risk Buyer and RiskWithFr Buyer as the number of sellers was varied. 
 
Figure 4.8: Percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by Risk 
Buyer and RiskWithFr Buyer in 50 transactions as the number of sellers is 
varied. 
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From Figure 4.8, we see that when there were 8 sellers, the difference between 
purchases made from honest, high quality sellers by Risk Buyer (84%) and 
RiskWithFr (86%)  Buyer was marginal.  As the number of sellers was increased in 
steps of 8, RiskWithFr Buyer made a significantly higher number of purchases from 
honest, high quality sellers than Risk Buyer.  When the market was populated by 24 
or more sellers, RiskWithFr Buyer made 50 to 58% of total purchases, and Risk 
Buyer made 18 to 50% of total purchases from honest, high quality sellers, 
confirming that as the seller count increases, performance of RiskWithFr Buyer is 
higher. 
Our next experiment was to determine to what degree a buyer’s opinions should 
match with a friend’s opinions, so that utilizing that friend’s opinions helps in 
improving the buyer’s performance.  In experiment 3 we kept the seller configuration 
the same as in experiment 1.  We considered six friends who were honest and with a 
seller rating scale of [-1, 1].  They were different in the percentage of time their seller 
rating matched that of RiskWithFr Buyer, as described next.  We looked at the 
performances of Risk Buyer and RiskWithFr Buyer and the latter had one the 
following six friends: 
1. 100Acc Friend: This friend’s opinions matched RiskWithFr Buyer’s opinions 
100 % of the time. 
2. 90Acc Friend:  This friend’s opinions matched RiskWithFr Buyer’s opinions 
90% of the time. 
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3. 80Acc Friend: This friend’s opinions matched RiskWithFr Buyer’s opinions 
80% of the time. 
4. 70Acc Friend:  This friend’s opinions matched RiskWithFr Buyer’s opinions 
70% of the time. 
5. 60Acc Friend: This friend’s opinions matched the RiskWithFr Buyer’s 
opinions 60% of the time. 
6. 50Acc Friend: This friend’s opinions matched RiskWithFr Buyer’s opinions 
50% of the time. 
We conducted 100 trials for each type of friend, and in each trial the buyers made 100 
transactions.  We had the friend make its 100 purchases first so that it would provide 
useful information to RiskWithFr Buyer.  We set α=0.5, β=-0.7, as we wanted the 
friend to be identified early.  We looked at how many purchases were made from 
honest, high quality sellers, and we looked at the percentage of total transactions 
when a friend’s opinions were used when making purchases and this information is 
shown in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7: Risk Buyer’s and RiskWithFr Buyer’s performances with friends of 
different degrees of similarity in opinions 
Buyer Friend 
Percentage of purchases 
from honest high quality 
sellers in X transactions 
Average percentage of  
transactions a friend’s opinion  
is used in X Transactions 
X=25 X=50 X=100 X=25 X=50 X=100 
Risk Buyer None 8% 34% 65% - - - 
RiskWithFr 
Buyer 
100Acc 
Friend 68% 80% 89% 92% 94% 97% 
RiskWithFr 
Buyer 
90Acc 
Friend 40% 36% 65% 88% 70% 80% 
RiskWithFr 
Buyer 
80Acc 
Friend 16% 36% 65% 68% 60% 70% 
RiskWithFr 
Buyer 
70Acc 
Friend 12% 36% 66% 60% 46% 
71%  
(In 50% of trials) 
15%  
(In 50% of trials) 
RiskWithFr 
Buyer 
60Acc 
Friend 12% 36% 66% 52% 28% 
13%  
(In 90% of trials) 
68%  
(In10% of trials) 
RiskWithFr 
Buyer 
50Acc 
Friend 12% 36% 65% 32% 18% 9% 
 
From Table 4.7 it can be seen that RiskWithFr Buyer makes the maximum number of 
purchases from honest, high quality sellers when it has a friend whose opinions match 
100% of the time to its own.  At lower number of purchases, the performance of 
RiskWithFr Buyer is substantially higher than Risk Buyer when utilizing the opinions 
of friends whose opinions match up to 80% of the time, whereas at higher frequency 
purchases the performance is substantially higher only when the opinions match 
100% of the time.  As the similarities of a friend’s opinions reduce, the percentage 
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time its opinions are utilized is also lower and the performance of RiskWithFr Buyer 
degrades down to Risk Buyer’s performance.  In the case of 100 purchases, the 
percentage time a friend’s opinion is utilized decreases significantly for friends whose 
opinions match less than 70% of the time, as compared to lower frequency purchases.  
At higher purchase frequency, RiskWithFr Buyer has sufficient interactions with the 
sellers to form its own impressions to realize that utilizing the opinion of such friends 
is not beneficial to it. 
Next we conducted experiment 4 to determine if there is a range of optimal values for 
α and β, the incremental and decreasing factors for adjusting a friend’s reputation.  
The seller configuration was the same as in experiments 1 and 3.  RiskWithFr Buyer 
had seven friends out of which six were the same as used in experiment 3, and the 
seventh friend was the Erratic Friend used in experiments 1 and 2.  We set different 
values of α and β and conducted 100 trials for each combination of α and β.  We 
compared the performance of  RiskWithFr Buyer for different values of α and β on 
the following parameters: percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers; 
number of times each type of friend was identified as trustworthy in 100 trials 
expressed as a percentage; and average percentage a friend’s opinion was utilized 
when identified as trustworthy in each trial.  This data is shown in Tables 4.8 and 4.9. 
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Table 4. 8 : Comparison of the performance of RiskWithFr Buyer for different 
values of α, and β  
No α, β 
Percentage 
of purchases 
from honest, 
high quality  
sellers in  
100 
Purchases 
First column under each friend is the average 
 percentage of trials a friend is identified as   
trustworthy in 100 trials, and the second column  
shows the average number of times  a friend’s opinion 
 is used in 100 transactions in each  trial  
100Acc 
Friend 
90Acc 
Friend 
80Acc 
Friend 
1 .5,-.9  81% 100% 96 100% 86 100% 77 
2 .5,-.7 82% 100% 97 100% 89 100% 82 
3 .5,.-5 81% 100% 97 100% 92 100% 86 
4 .4 -.9  81% 100% 95 100% 82 100% 70 
5 .4, -.6 83% 100% 96 100% 87 100% 78 
6 .4, -.4  82% 100% 97 100% 90 100% 84 
7 .3, -.9  81% 100% 93 100% 72 100% 51 
8 .3, -.7  81% 100% 94 100% 81 100% 63 
9 .3,-.5  82% 100% 95 100% 83 100% 72 
10 .3,-.3  80% 100% 95 100% 88 100% 81 
11 .2, -.8  80% 100% 90 100% 60 85% 31 
12 .2, -.6  80% 100% 92 100% 68 100% 45 
13 .2, -.4  80% 100% 93 100% 76 100% 61 
14 .2, -.3  82% 100% 93 100% 81 100 70 
15 .2 -.2  80% 100% 94 100% 85 100% 77 
16 .1,-.9  76% 100% 70 65% 20 0% 0 
17 .1, -0.2 75% 100% 87 100% 69 100% 51 
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Table 4. 9 :Comparison of the performance of RiskWithFr Buyer for different 
values of α, and β 
No α, β 
First column under each friend is the average  
percentage of trials a friend is identified as  
 trustworthy in100 trials,  and the second column  
shows the  average number of times  a  friend’s opinion  
is used in 100 transactions in each  trial  
70Acc 
Friend 
Acc60 
Friend 
Acc50 
 Friend 
Erratic 
Friend 
1 .5,-.9  100% 61 100% 39 80% 30 35% 6 
2 .5,-.7 100% 73 100% 55 93% 47 38% 10 
3 .5,.-5 100% 81 100% 73 100% 58 48% 21 
4 .4 -.9  100% 46 100% 19 100% 0 25% 1 
5 .4, -.6 100% 68 100% 52 68% 38 43% 7 
6 .4, -.4  100% 78 100% 70 94% 57 61% 19 
7 .3, -.9  100% 29 100% 1 0% 0 14% 5 
8 .3, -.7  100% 49 100% 10 0% 0 8% 8 
9 .3,-.5  100% 60 100% 35 0% 0 30% 4 
10 .3,-.3  100% 75 100% 66 85% 50 59% 18 
11 .2, -.8  0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 2% 7 
12 .2, -.6  60% 24 0% 0 0% 0 3% 6 
13 .2, -.4  99% 44 1% 9 0% 0 10% 10 
14 .2, -.3  100 59 92% 35 0% 0 8% 10 
15 .2 -.2  100% 70 100% 58 85% 34 47% 16 
16 .1,-.9  0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 2% 5 
17 .1, -0.2 90% 26 1% 36 1% 30 1% 32 
 
The desirable values for α, β would be when the following criteria are satisfied. 
1. Percentage of purchases from honest high quality sellers should be high. 
2. Friends whose opinions match up to 80% of the time should be identified as 
trustworthy 100% of the time, and the number of times their opinion is utilized 
should be high, as they can be helpful to the buyer when making infrequent 
purchases as shown in Table 4.7. 
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3. Friends whose opinions do no match greater than 60% of the time should not be 
identified as trustworthy or, if identified as such, the number of times their 
opinions is used should be very low (as we saw in Table 4.7, when the buyer has 
sufficient time to make judgments about sellers on its own, the number of times 
the opinions of untrustworthy friends is utilized is very low). 
4. Erratic friends should not be identified as trustworthy or, if identified as such, the 
number of times their opinion is utilized should be very low. 
Applying the above criteria to the data collected in experiment 4, we narrowed down 
the preferred values for α, β and these values and the performance of RiskWithFr 
Buyer at these values are highlighted in tables 4.8 and 4.9.  Our results indicate that 
0.2 ≤ α ≤ 0.4 and 2α ≤ β ≤ 3α.  For α less than 0.2, the average percentage of 
purchases from honest, high quality sellers is lower than when α is greater than or 
equal to 0.2 (lines 16 and 17 in table 4.8).  When α ≥ 0.4 or β=α, friends whose 
opinions match less than 70% of the time are identified frequently and number of 
times their opinions is utilized is high (lines 1, 2, 3, 10 and 15 in Table 4.9).  When β 
is slightly greater than α, then friends whose opinions match 60% of the time are 
identified frequently and their opinions utilization is high (lines 9 and 14 in Table 
4.9).  When the value of β ≥ 3α friends whose opinions match 80% of time or greater  
are not identified as trustworthy all the time and their opinions utilization is low (line 
11 in Table 4.8).  Thus α should be between 0.2 and 0.4, and for a given value of α, β 
should be 2 to 3 times the value of α. 
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4.4 Phase III  
In this phase, we compared the two different methods of identifying trustworthy 
friends and utilizing the information provided by them.  Data was collected from 
experiments 1 and 2 as described in section 4.2.  In experiment 1, we populated the 
market with 32 sellers, with four sellers from each category in table 4.3.  We also 
populated the market with 14 buyers comprising of 6 buyers, one from each category 
in table 4.4 and one of each type of 8 friends summarized in table 4.5.  We conducted 
100 trials.  In each trial buyers made 500 purchases or transactions with sellers.  In 
experiment 2, the buyer configuration was the same as in experiment 1.  We varied 
the number of sellers in the market and conducted 100 trials for each seller count.  
The buyers made 500 transactions in each trial.   In this phase, we looked at the 
performances of buyers when making 50 purchases only, as the goal was to study 
how different buyers performed when making fewer purchases with different sellers 
in the market.  We analyzed the buyers’ performance with different seller counts at 
different purchase levels in phase V. 
From the data collected in experiments 1 and 2, performances of RiskWithFr Buyer 
and OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer were compared.   RiskWithFr Buyer uses the first 
method (section 3.2.1) of identifying trustworthy friends.  In this method, 1) friends’ 
opinions and numerical ratings of sellers are used to identify trustworthy friends, and, 
2) trustworthy friends’ opinions and ratings of sellers along with the RiskWithFr 
Buyer’s own information are used to choose a seller to purchase from.  
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OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer uses the second method (section 3.2.2) of identifying 
trustworthy friends.  In this method, 1) only friends’ opinions of sellers are used to 
identify trustworthy friends, and, 2) trustworthy friends’ opinions of sellers along 
with OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer’s own information are used to choose a seller to 
purchase from.  The two buyers, RiskWithFr Buyer and OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer, 
were compared in their abilities: to identify trustworthy friends, time taken to identify 
trustworthy friends, and the percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers 
at different levels of purchase, and as the number of sellers in the market was varied.  
We wanted to determine which method (first or second) of identifying trusted friends 
and using information from them is superior. 
Table 4.9 shows the performance of the two buyers against different friend types. 
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Table 4.10: Comparison of RiskWithFr (RFr) Buyer and OOnlyRiskWithFr 
(OORFr) Buyer against different friends 
Friend 
Average transaction when a 
friend is first identified as a 
trustworthy friend 
Average percentage of 500 
transactions a friend’s opinion 
is used in each trial. 
Percentage of 100 trials 
identified  as a 
trustworthy friend   
RFr Buyer 
OORFr  
Buyer 
RFr 
Buyer 
OORFr  
Buyer 
RFr Buyer 
OORFr  
Buyer 
Friends with similar opinions 
Risk 
Friend 13 6  96%   99% 100% 100% 
CD-0.5 
Friend 8 6  96%   99% 100% 100% 
CM-10 
Friend 39 6 76%  99% 100% 100% 
N-01 
Friend 11 6  94%   99% 100% 100% 
Friends with slightly different opinions 
SDO 
Friend  28 7  84%   99% 100% 100% 
Tran 
Friend 119 47  73%   91% 100% 100% 
Friends with very different opinions 
VDO 
Friend 38 6  3%  0.2% 14% 11% 
Lying Friend 
Erratic 
Friend 20 8 0.4%   4% 3 % 7% 
The desired behavior from the two buyers is that honest friends with similar opinions 
(Risk Friend, CD-0.5 Friend, CM-10 Friend, and N-01 Friend) are identified as 
trustworthy at the earliest and their opinions are utilized all the time once they are 
identified.  Friends with very different opinions (VDO Friend) or lying friends 
(Erratic Friend) should not be identified as a trustworthy friend at all, or if 
erroneously identified, buyers should be able to quickly realize their mistake and not 
utilize the opinions of such friends.  As it would take longer to identify friends with 
slightly different opinions (SDO Friend and Tran Friend) as trustworthy, 
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consequently, the opinions of such friends should be utilized a lesser number of times 
as compared to honest friends with similar opinions. 
From table 4.9 it can be seen that, with regard to honest friends with similar opinions, 
OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer identifies them earlier than RiskWithFr Buyer and also 
utilizes their opinions a larger number of times.  For friends whose opinions differed 
slightly (SDO Friend and Tran Friend), OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer identified them as 
trustworthy a lot earlier than RiskWithFr Buyer and also utilized their opinions to a 
higher extent than RiskWithFr Buyer. VDO Friend which had very different opinions 
was erroneously identified as trustworthy in 14% of the 100 trials by RiskWithFr 
Buyer and in 11% of the trials by OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer.  Both buyers are able to 
recognize their mistake, which is indicated by the fact that VDO Friend’s opinions 
were utilized on an average of 3% by RiskWithFr Buyer and 0.2% by 
OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer.  Erratic Friend was incorrectly identified as a trustworthy 
friend in 3% of the 100 trials by RiskWithFr Buyer and its opinions were utilized less 
than half percent of all transactions.  Erratic friend was incorrectly identified as a 
trustworthy friend in 8% of the 100 trials by OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer and its 
opinions were utilized on an average of 4% of all transactions. 
Our results indicate that compared to RiskWithFr Buyer, OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer 
does well in good to optimal conditions. However, it does a lot worse in adversarial 
environment. When the friends were honest in their replies, irrespective of their 
similarities in opinions, performance of OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer’s performance was 
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superior to RiskWithFr Buyer’s performance.  However, in the case of lying friend, 
RiskWithFr Buyer’s performance was better.   It erroneously identified lying friend as 
trustworthy in fewer trials, and when the lying friend was incorrectly identified as 
trustworthy, RiskWithFr Buyer was able to correct its mistake a lot sooner than 
OOnlyRiskWithFr. 
Next we compared the performance of the two buyers on the number of purchases 
made from honest, high quality sellers.  Figure 4.9 shows the percentage of purchases 
made from honest, high quality sellers by RiskWithFr Buyer and OOnlyRiskWithFr 
Buyer at different levels of purchases. 
 
Figure 4.9: Percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by 
RiskWithFr Buyer and OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer versus total number of 
purchases with 32 sellers in the market. 
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It can be seen that, OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer outperforms RiskWithFr Buyer at all 
levels of purchases, and the percentage improvement is higher at a lower number of 
purchases.  Over 100 trials, in 25 purchases, RiskWithFr Buyer made on average 48% 
of total purchases from honest, high quality sellers as compared to OOnlyRiskWithFr 
Buyer who made 72% of total purchases from honest, high quality sellers, which is an 
improvement of 50%.  In 50 purchases, the average percentage of purchases from 
honest, high quality sellers by RiskWithFR Buyer was 56%, and the 
OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer made 86% of total purchases, an improvement of 53%.  In 
100 transactions, the average percentage of purchases from honest, high quality 
sellers by RiskWithFr Buyer was 72% and by OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer was 93%, a 
percentage increase of 29%.  In 500 purchases, the average percentage of purchases 
from honest, high quality sellers by RiskWithFr Buyer was 94% and 
OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer made 99% of total purchases, an improvement of 5%.  
When buyers are making frequent purchases, they are in the market long enough to 
figure out who the best sellers are and then tend to purchase frequently from them.  
Hence the difference in the performances of RiskBuyerWithFr Buyer and 
OOnlyRiskBuyerWithFr Buyer reduces as the purchase frequency increases. 
From the data collected in experiment 2, we compared the average percentage of 
purchases made from honest, high quality sellers in 50 purchases, by RiskWithFr 
Buyer and OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer, as the number of sellers was varied.  Figure 4.10 
shows the average percentage of purchases made from honest, high quality sellers in 
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50 purchases by RiskWithFr Buyer and OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer as the number of 
sellers was varied. 
 
Figure 4.10: Percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by 
RiskWithFr Buyer and OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer in 50 purchases as the number 
of sellers is varied. 
It can be seen from figure 4.10, that as the number of sellers is increased, there is no 
significant difference in the number of purchases made from honest, high quality 
sellers by OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer, whereas the number of purchases made from 
honest, high quality sellers by RiskWithFr Buyer reduces.  From Figure 4.10, we see 
that when there were 8 sellers, there was no difference between the purchases made 
from honest, high quality sellers by RiskWithFr Buyer (86%) and OOnlyRiskWithFr 
Buyer (86%).  As the number of sellers was increased in steps of 8, the percentage of 
purchases from honest, high quality sellers by RiskWithFr Buyer comes down from 
86% to 50% whereas the percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by 
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OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer remains steady over 80%, confirming that at higher seller 
counts the performance of OOnlyRskWithFr Buyer is superior. 
Overall, OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer has a superior performance as compared to 
RiskWithFr Buyer in environments where majority of friends are honest. 
OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer is able to utilize the opinions of trustworthy friends more 
often than RiskWithFr Buyer.  Like RiskWithFr Buyer, it is successful in avoiding 
friends with very different opinions by either identifying them correctly as having 
different opinions, or if a mistake has been made, it is able to correct it quickly.  It is 
able to make higher number of purchases from honest, high quality sellers than 
RiskWithFr Buyer at lower frequencies of purchase, and its performance remains 
fairly constant as the number of sellers is varied, whereas the performance of 
RiskWithFr Buyer decreases as the number of sellers is increased. 
We think OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer’s performance is superior because it is using only 
friends’ opinions in identifying trustworthy friends.  RiskWithFr Buyer on the other 
hand uses friends’ opinions and ratings of sellers.  RiskWithFr Buyer considers a 
friend trustworthy when the friend’s reputation exceeds a threshold value (which 
happens because its opinions regarding sellers have been similar to RiskWithFr 
Buyer), and the standard deviation of the differences in RiskWithFr Buyer’s ratings 
and the friend’s ratings of sellers is below a certain threshold value.  So if the 
opinions continue to match, but the standard deviation of the differences between 
RiskWithFr Buyer’s ratings and the friend’s ratings of sellers falls below the 
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threshold value, then that friend will not be considered trustworthy and that friend’s 
information will not be incorporated into the decision making.  There will be a 
consistent difference between the buyer’s rating and a friend’s rating only if the rating 
mechanisms of the buyer and the friend follow the same curve.  Friends may be 
honest and their recommendation for a seller may be similar to the buyer’s, however 
if the standard deviation of the differences in ratings is not small, then their opinions 
will not be considered in the first approach.  On the other hand, OOnlyRiskWithFr 
Buyer considers a friend as trustworthy if the friend’s reputation simply exceeds a 
threshold value.  As long as the friend’s opinions and OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer’s 
opinions match, then that friend is included in the list of trustworthy friends whose 
information should be used in decision making. 
Our results also show that OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer’s performance is inferior to 
RiskWithFr Buyer in detecting the nature of lying friends, and leads us to conclude 
that its performance will be worse than RiskWithFr Buyer in adversarial conditions 
where  majority of friends are either erratic or deliberately lie.  While utilizing the 
opinions and rating of sellers by friends to detect trustworthy friends is a slower 
cautious approach, it also enables the buyer to correctly detect untrustworthy friends.  
Utilizing only opinions of sellers to identify trustworthy friends is faster, but it also 
makes the buyer more vulnerable in adverse conditions.  
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4.5 Phase IV 
In this phase we compared conservative and risk taking attitudes of buyers.  We 
wanted to see how attitude affects the performance of the buyers when they are acting 
alone and when they have friends.  
From the data collected in experiment 1 and 2 (section 4.2), first, we compared the 
performances of Risk Buyer and Cns Buyer.  Risk Buyer and Cns Buyer make 
decisions regarding purchases based on their own experiences with sellers and use our 
direct trust rating model as described in section 3.1 in chapter 3 for evaluating sellers. 
A Risk Buyer’s attitude towards new buyers is “Risk Taking,” which means that new 
or unexplored buyers are always included in the list of potential sellers.  Cns Buyer 
purchases from new sellers during its exploration of the market, where the 
exploration rate is proportional to the ratio of new sellers to all the sellers in the 
market.  The detailed policy of a buyer with conservative attitude regarding new 
sellers is described in section 3.5 of chapter 3.  Figure 4.11 shows the percentage of 
purchases made from honest, high quality sellers by Risk Buyer and Cns Buyer at 
different levels of purchases   when the market was populated with 32 sellers. 
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Figure 4.11: Percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by Risk 
Buyer and Cns Buyer versus total number of purchases with 32 sellers in the 
market. 
It can be seen that Cns Buyer has a superior performance compared to Risk Buyer at a 
lower number of purchases.  Over 100 trials, in 25 purchases, Risk Buyer made on 
average 8% of its total purchases from honest, high quality sellers as compared to Cns 
Buyer who made 48% of total purchases from honest, high quality sellers, which is an 
improvement of 500%.  In 50 purchases, the average percentage of purchases from 
honest, high quality sellers by Risk Buyer was 36%, and Cns Buyer made 68% of 
total purchases, an improvement of 89%.  In 100 purchases, the average percentage of 
purchases from honest, high quality sellers by Risk Buyer was 65% and by Cns Buyer 
was 78%, a percentage increase of 20%.  In 500 purchases, the average percentage of 
purchases from honest, high quality seller by Risk Buyer was 93% and Cns Buyer 
made 92% of total purchases, a decrease of 1.1%.  When buyers are making frequent 
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purchases, they are in the market long enough to figure out who the best sellers are 
and then tend to purchase frequently from them.  Hence the difference in the 
performances of Risk Buyer and Cns Buyer reduces at high levels of purchase. 
From data collected in experiment 2, we compared the average percentage of 
purchases made from honest, high quality sellers in 50 purchases, by Risk Buyer and 
Cns Buyer, as the number of sellers was varied.  This is shown in figure 4.12.  
 
Figure 4.12: Percentage of purchases made by Risk Buyer and Cns Buyer from 
honest, high quality sellers in 50 purchases as the number of sellers is varied. 
From Figure 4.12, we see that when there were up to 16 sellers in the market, the 
differences between Risk Buyer (84% for 8 sellers and 66% for 16 sellers) and Cns 
Buyer (82% for 8 sellers and 70% for 16 sellers) were marginal.  As the number of 
sellers was increased in steps of 8, the percentage of purchases from honest, high 
quality sellers by Risk Buyer came down from 66% to 18%, whereas the percentage 
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of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by Cns Buyer remained steadily over 
65%.  
When the buyers are acting alone, a buyer with conservative attitude has a superior 
performance compared to a buyer with risk taking attitude, at lower number of 
purchases, and at higher numbers of sellers.  We think this is because a buyer with 
risk taking attitude always purchases from new sellers if they are offering a lower 
price than the best seller that the buyer has purchased from in the past, whereas a 
conservative buyer is cautious in its approach. 
A buyer with conservative attitude had better performance than a buyer with risk 
taking attitude when acting alone.  We wanted to see if this would remain the same or 
change in the case of buyers with friends.  Figure 4.13 shows the average percentage 
of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by RiskWithFr Buyer and CnsWithFr 
Buyer at different levels of purchases.  Both these buyers use the first method of 
identifying trustworthy friends (section 3.2.1). 
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Figure 4.13: Percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by 
RiskWithFr Buyer and CnsWithFr Buyer versus total number of purchases, 
when the market is populated with 32 sellers. 
It can be seen that, CnsWithFr Buyer’s performance is marginally higher than 
RiskWithFr Buyer’s at lower number of purchases.  Over 100 trials, in 25 purchases, 
RiskWithFr Buyer made on average 48% of total purchases from honest, high quality 
sellers as compared to CnsWithFr Buyer who made 52% of total purchases from 
honest, high quality sellers, which is an improvement of 8%.  In 50 purchases, the 
average percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by RiskWithFr 
Buyer was 56%, and CnsWithFr Buyer made 66% of total purchases, an improvement 
of 18%.  In 100 transactions, the average percentage of purchases from honest, high 
quality sellers by Risk WithFr Buyer was 72% and by CnsWithFr Buyer was 80%, a 
percentage increase of 11%.  In 500 purchases, the average percentage of purchases 
from honest, high quality seller by RiskWithFr Buyer was 94% and CnsWithFr Buyer 
made 95% of total purchases, an increase of 1%.  
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From data collected in experiment 2, we compared the average percentage of 
purchases made from honest, high quality sellers in 50 purchases, by RiskWithFr 
Buyer and CnsWithFr Buyer, as the number of sellers was varied.  This is shown in 
figure 4.14.  
 
Figure 4.14: Percentage of purchases made from honest, high quality sellers by 
RiskWithFr Buyer and CnsWithFr Buyers in 50 purchases as the number of 
sellers is varied. 
From Figure 4.14, we see that as the number of sellers was increased, the average 
percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers came down for both sellers.  
As the number of sellers was increased in steps of 8, the percentage of purchases from 
honest, high quality sellers by RiskWithFr Buyer came down from 86% to 50%, 
whereas the percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by CnsWithFr 
Buyer came down from 84% to 62%.  When the market was populated with more 
than 16 sellers, CnsWithFr Buyer’s purchases from honest, high quality sellers were 
10% higher than RskWithFr Buyer’s purchases from the same category of sellers.  
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When the market had less than 16 sellers, the differences in purchases from honest, 
high quality sellers by both buyers were marginal. 
When buyers used the first method to identify trusted friends, a buyer with 
conservative attitude, CnsBuyerWithFr Buyer, performed slightly better (by about 8-
10%) than a buyer with risk taking attitude, RskWithFr Buyer, at lower levels of 
purchases and at higher number of sellers. 
Figure 4.15 shows the average percentage of purchases from honest, high quality 
sellers by OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer and OOnlyCnsWithFr Buyer at different levels of 
purchases when the market was populated with 32 sellers.  Both these buyers use the 
second method of identifying trustworthy friends (section 3.2.2). 
 
Figure 4.15: Percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by 
OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer and OOnlyCnsWithFr Buyer versus total number of 
purchases when the market is populated with 32 sellers. 
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It can be seen from figure 4.15 that, OOnlyRskWithFr Buyer’s average percentage of 
purchases from honest, high quality sellers (72% in 25, 86% in 50, 93% in 100, and 
99% in 500) is almost the same or marginally higher than OOnlyCnsWithFr Buyer’s 
average percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers (64% in 25, 80% in 
50, 89% in 100, and 98% in 500).   
Figure 4.16 shows the average percentage of purchases from honest, high quality 
sellers by OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer and OOnlyCnsWithFr Buyer in 50 purchases as 
the number of sellers was varied.  
 
Figure 4.16: Percentage of purchases made from honest, high quality sellers by 
OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer and OOnlyCnsWithFr Buyer in 50 purchases  as the 
number of sellers is varied. 
From Figure 4.16, it can be seen that as the number of sellers is increased, the average 
percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers remains almost the same for 
OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer, and it reduces by about 10% for OOnlyCnsWithFrBuyer.  
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When buyers used the second method to identify trusted friends, performance of a 
buyer with risk taking attitude (OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer) was slightly better than the 
performance of a buyer with conservative attitude (OOnlyCnsWithFr Buyer) at lower 
number of purchases and higher number of sellers.  On the other hand, when buyers 
were acting alone or using the first method of identifying trustworthy friends, 
performance of buyers with conservative attitude was better than buyers with risk 
taking attitude at lower number of purchases, and at higher number of sellers. 
4.6 Phase V 
In this phase we compared the performances of all buyers at different levels of 
purchases, as the number of sellers was varied.  We wanted to see if any particular 
combination of buyer attitude and seller modeling would yield the best performance. 
From data collected in experiment 2 (section 4.2), we compared the average 
percentage of purchases made from honest, high quality sellers in 25, 50, 100 and 500 
purchases, by Risk Buyer, Cns Buyer, RiskWithFr Buyer, CnsWithFr Buyer, 
OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer, and OOnlyCnsWithFr Buyer, as the number of sellers was 
varied.  Figures 4.17 4.18, 4.19, and 4.20 show the percentage of purchases made by 
various buyers from honest, high quality sellers in 25, 50, 100, and 500 purchases as 
the number of sellers was varied. 
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Figure 4.17: Percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by various 
buyers in 25 purchases as the number of sellers is varied. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by various 
buyers in 50 purchases as the number of sellers is varied. 
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Figure 4.19: Percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by various 
buyers in 100 purchases as the number of sellers is varied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.20: Percentage of purchases from honest, high quality sellers by various 
buyers in 500 purchases as the number of sellers is varied. 
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Figure 4.20 shows the performance of buyers when making frequent purchases. It can 
be seen that when there were fewer sellers in the market, the difference in the 
performance of various buyers was marginal.  As the number of sellers was increased, 
the performances of OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer and OOnlyCnsWithFr Buyer remained 
steady; RiskWithFr Buyer and CnsWithFr Buyer experienced a decrease of 5-7% in 
their performance, and Risk and Cns Buyer experienced a decrease of about 10% in 
their performance.  
Figures 4.17, 4.18 and 4.19 show the performance of buyers when making infrequent 
purchases.  It can be seen that OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer and OOnlyCnsWithFr Buyer 
had the best performance.  As the number of sellers was increased, OOnlyRiskWithFr 
Buyer experienced a slight decrease in its performance, whereas, OOnlyCnsWithFr 
Buyer experienced a higher decrease in its performance.  Risk Buyer had the lowest 
performance among all buyers.  Buyers with risk taking attitudes showed significant 
improvements with both methods of identifying trustworthy friends.  RiskWithFr 
Buyer’s performance was higher than Risk Buyer, but lower than OOnlyRiskWithFr 
Buyer.  The performances of RiskWithFr Buyer, CnsWithFr Buyer and Cns Buyer 
were similar when there were fewer sellers in the market.  CnsWithFr Buyer’s and 
Cns Buyer’s performances were better than RiskWithFr Buyer’s when the number of 
sellers was high in the market.   CnsWithFr Buyer’s performance did not show any 
significant improvement over Cns Buyer performance.  Its performance was 
marginally higher than Cns Buyer’s performance at lower number of sellers, and then 
marginally lower when the number of sellers was high in the market.  
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OOnlyCnsWithFr Buyer’s performance showed a significant improvement over 
CnsWithFr Buyer and Cns Buyer. 
When buyers are making decisions based on their own information, Cns Buyer, a 
buyer with conservative attitude has the best performance.  Intuitively this makes 
sense.  When a buyer is acting alone, the buyer needs to be prudent.    
When buyers are utilizing information provided by their trusted friends, 
OOnlyRiskWithFR Buyer, a buyer with risk taking attitude and using the second 
method of identifying trusted friends had the best performance.  Buyers with 
conservative and risk taking attitudes utilizing only the trusted friends’ opinions 
(OOnlyRiskWithFr Buyer and OOnlyCnsWithFr Buyer) fared better than buyers 
using trusted friends’ opinions and ratings of sellers (RiskWithFr Buyer and 
CnsWithFrBuyer ).  
4.7 Summary 
To test our model, we developed a simulation of an electronic market consisting of a 
Matchmaker [31], buyer agents, and seller agents, which communicate with each 
other.  At any time Matchmaker has a current list of all sellers active in the market.  
Buyers obtain list of sellers for a product from the Matchmaker.  Next, they obtain 
price quotes from sellers by contacting them individually.  Buyers may belong to a 
community comprising of buyers.  Members of the community are referred to as 
friends.  While evaluating sellers for purchase decisions a buyer, with friends, 
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requests for seller information from friends.  However, there is no guarantee that 
friends are honest or sharing similar opinions.  In our model: 
 We presented a method for a buyer to evaluate sellers based on its direct 
interactions. 
  We presented two methods of identifying trustworthy (honest and share 
similar opinions) friends and utilizing information from them.  
 We considered risk taking and conservative attitude of buyers. 
We tested various components of our model in five phases.  In Phase I, our goal was 
to test buyer’s method of evaluating sellers based on direct interactions.   We  
populated the market with various sellers (varying quality, honest, dishonest, and 
varying prices) and compared the performance of a buyer using our method of rating 
sellers based on direct interactions with buyers using models, for rating sellers based 
on direct interactions, proposed by other researchers (Tran [49], and Vidal and Durfee 
[53]).  The time taken by various buyers to learn to identify high quality, low priced 
sellers was used as a metric to compare various buyers.  In our experiment each buyer 
made 500 transactions and in each transaction they purchased from a seller using their 
learning strategy.  Our results show that all buyers learn at different rates to identify 
high quality, low priced sellers.  After having learnt, they consistently interact with 
high quality, low priced sellers.  A buyer using our method of rating sellers based on 
direct interactions was the quickest to learn in 15 transactions.  A buyer using Tran’s 
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model [49] took about 60 transactions and a buyer using Vidal and Durfee’s model 
[53] took about 250 transactions.    
Our experimental setup for phases II to V was the same.  We populated the market 
with various sellers (varying quality, honest, dishonest and varying prices) and with 
different types of buyer friends (honest, lying, similar opinions, different opinions).  
We studied the performances of various buyers with conservative attitude or risk 
taking attitude, acting alone using our method of rating sellers based on direct 
interactions, or with friends using our method of rating sellers based on direct 
interactions and one of the two methods of identifying trustworthy (honest and 
sharing similar opinions) friends that has been presented in this dissertation.  All the 
buyers made 500 transactions and in each transaction they obtained seller list from 
Matchmaker, obtained price quotes from sellers, requested for seller information from 
friends if they had friends, waited for a certain period of time for responses and made 
their decision to purchase from a seller.  We had the friends make their purchases first 
so that they could provide useful information to buyers requesting for it. 
 In Phase II, our goal was to test the first method of identifying and utilizing 
information from trustworthy friends as described in section 3.2.1.  In this method, 
the buyer requests for friend’s opinions, and ratings of sellers.  The buyer uses 
friend’s opinions and standard deviation of the differences between friends’ ratings 
and it’s ratings of sellers to identify trustworthy friends.  The reputation ratings of 
sellers provided by trustworthy friends are adjusted to account for the differences in 
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the friends’ and the buyer’s rating systems and combined with the buyer’s rating of 
sellers to identify potential sellers to purchase from.  The metrics used were: ability to 
identify trustworthy friends, time taken to identify trustworthy friends, and percentage 
of purchases from honest, high quality sellers at different levels of purchase, and as 
the number of sellers in the market was varied.  Desired behavior is that honest 
friends who share similar opinions are identified at the earliest and their information 
about sellers utilized all the time.  Friends who are not honest, or who do not share 
similar opinions should not be identified as trustworthy and their information 
regarding sellers should not be utilized at all.  Buyer with friends should make higher 
percentage of purchases than buyer acting alone from honest, high quality sellers.  
Our results show that honest friends with similar opinions were identified as 
trustworthy in all the 100 trials, their opinions were utilized from 76% to 96% of 500 
transactions in each trial.  Honest friends with slightly different opinions were also 
identified as trustworthy in all the 100 trials, and their opinions were utilized from 
72% to 84% of 500 transactions.  Honest friend with very different opinions was 
successfully identified as not trustworthy in 86 of the 100 trials.  In 14 trials, it was 
erroneously identified as trustworthy.  However the buyer was able to realize its 
mistake which is indicated by the fact that its opinions were utilized only 3% of 500 
transactions in each of the 14 trials.  Lying friend was correctly identified as not 
trustworthy in 97 of 100 trials.  It was incorrectly identified as trustworthy in 3 trials. 
However its opinions were utilized less than 1% of 500 transactions in each of those 3 
trials.  Our results also show that once trustworthy friends have been identified and 
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their opinions have been utilized in decision making, a buyer using our first model of 
identifying trustworthy friends has superior performance than a buyer acting alone at 
lower levels of purchases and for increasing numbers of sellers in the market.   
In Phase III, we evaluated the second method of identifying and utilizing information 
from trustworthy friends as described in section 3.2.2.   In this method, the buyer 
requests for only friend’s opinions of sellers.  The buyer uses friend’s opinions to 
identify trustworthy friends.  Based on a trusted friend’s opinion, reputation value is 
assigned to a seller.  Assigned reputation values and the buyer’s ratings of sellers are 
combined to identify potential sellers to purchase from.  We compared the 
performances of buyers with friends using first and second method of identifying 
trustworthy friends.  We wanted to determine if any method (first or second) of 
identifying trusted friends and using information from them is superior.  Metrics used 
in Phase III were exactly the same as in Phase II.  
Results for a buyer using the first method of identifying trustworthy friends were 
presented in Phase II.  Our results show that for a buyer using the second method, 
honest friends with similar opinions were identified as trustworthy in all the 100 
trials, and their opinions were utilized in 99% of 500 transactions in each trial.  
Honest friends with slightly different opinions were also identified as trustworthy in 
all the 100 trials, and their opinions were utilized from 91% to 99% of 500 
transactions in each trial.  Honest friend with very different opinions was successfully 
identified as not trustworthy in 89 of the 100 trials.  In 11 trials, it was erroneously 
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identified as trustworthy.   However the buyer was able to realize its mistake which is 
indicated by the fact that its opinions were utilized less than 1% in each of the 11 
trials.  Lying friend was correctly identified as not trustworthy in 93 of 100 trials.  It 
was incorrectly identified as trustworthy in 7 trials and its opinions were utilized 4% 
in each of those 7 trials. 
Between the two methods, a buyer utilizing the second method of identifying trusted 
friends had a superior performance compared to a buyer using the first method of 
identifying trusted friends in our testing environment where majority of friends were 
honest.  Our results show that a buyer using the second method of identifying 
trustworthy performs   inferiorly to a buyer utilizing the first method of identifying 
trustworthy friends in detecting the nature of lying friends and leads us to conclude 
that its performance will be worse than a buyer utilizing the first method in 
adversarial conditions where majority of friends are either erratic or deliberately lie.  
In Phase IV, we analyzed the performances of buyers with risk taking and 
conservative approaches.  A buyer with risk tasking attitude considers a new seller as 
reputable initially and tends to purchase from a new seller if they are offering the 
lowest price among reputable sellers.  A buyer with conservative attitude is cautious 
in its approach and explores new sellers at a rate proportional to the ratio of 
unexplored sellers to all the sellers who have sent bids. We compared the 
performances of risk taking and conservative buyers when they are acting alone and 
when they have friends.  Metric used was: percentage of purchases from honest, high 
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quality sellers at different levels of purchase, and as the number of sellers in the 
market was varied.  We wanted to see how attitude affects performance of buyers 
when they are acting alone and when they have friends.  When buyers used the 
second method to identify trusted friends, performance of a buyer with risk taking 
attitude was slightly better than the performance of a buyer with conservative attitude 
at lower number of purchases and at higher number of sellers.  On the other hand, 
when buyers were acting alone or using the first method of identifying trustworthy 
friends, performance of buyers with conservative attitude was better than buyers with 
risk taking attitude at lower number of purchases, and at higher number of sellers. 
In Phase V, we compared performances of all buyers (risk taking, conservative, 
acting alone, and with friends) at different levels of purchases, and as the number of 
sellers was varied.  We compared all buyers on the following metric: percentage of 
purchases from honest, high quality sellers at different levels of purchase, and as the 
number of sellers in the market was varied.  We wanted to see if any particular 
combination of buyer attitude and seller modeling yields the best performance.  Our 
results show that when buyers are making decisions based on their own information, a 
buyer with conservative attitude has the best performance.   When buyers are utilizing 
information provided by their trusted friends, a buyer with risk taking attitude and 
using the second method of identifying trusted friends had the best performance.  
Buyers with conservative and risk taking attitudes utilizing only the trusted friends’ 
opinions fared better than buyers using trusted friends’ opinions and ratings of sellers.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusion and Future Work                                                                           
5.1 Summary 
In this dissertation we presented strategies for buyers to choose sellers in 
decentralized, open, dynamic, uncertain and untrusted multi agent based electronic 
markets.  We considered a marketplace where the behavior of sellers and buyers can 
vary, sellers and buyers can enter and leave the market any time, and sellers may be 
dishonest.  The buyer models sellers based on its direct interactions with them, and 
may exchange seller information with other buyer friends in the market.  There is no 
guarantee that when other buyers provide information, they are truthful or share 
similar opinions or have similar seller rating scales.   
First we presented a method for a buyer to model seller reputation based on direct 
interactions.  The buyer computes a seller’s reputation based on its ability to meet its 
expectations of product quality and price as compared to its competitors.  We show 
that a buyer acting alone, utilizing our model of maintaining seller reputation and 
buying strategy, does better than buyers acting alone employing strategies proposed 
previously by other researchers for frequent as well as for infrequent purchases. 
Next we presented two methods for buyers in an electronic market to identify other 
trustworthy buyer friends, who are honest and have similar opinions regarding sellers.  
In both methods, the buyer models other buyers who provide seller information when 
it requests for it.  In the first method, the buyer utilizes friends’ opinions and ratings 
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of sellers to identify trustworthy friends.  The reputation of sellers provided by 
trustworthy friends are adjusted to account for the differences in the rating systems 
between the buyer and its trustworthy friends, and then combined with the buyer’s 
own information on sellers to choose high quality, low priced sellers.  In the second 
method, the buyer utilizes only friends’ opinions of sellers to identify trustworthy 
friends.  Ratings are assigned to sellers based on trustworthy friend’s opinions and 
combined with the buyer’s own rating on sellers to choose a high quality, low priced 
seller to purchase from. 
We conducted experiments to show that both methods are successful in distinguishing 
between trustworthy friends whose opinions should be utilized in decision making 
and untrustworthy friends who are either dishonest, or have different opinions, and 
whose opinions should not be used in decision making.  For the first method, our 
results show that honest friends with similar opinions were identified as trustworthy 
friends in all the 100 trials, they were among the earliest to be identified as 
trustworthy, and their opinions were utilized 76% to 96% of all transactions in each 
trial.  Honest friends with slightly different opinions were also identified as 
trustworthy in all the trials, and their opinions were utilized 72-84% of all 
transactions in each trial.  Honest friends with very different opinions were 
erroneously identified as trustworthy in 14% of our trials, and their opinions were 
utilized in 3% of all transactions in trials where they were identified as trustworthy.  
Lying friends were erroneously identified as trustworthy in 3% of 100 trials, and their 
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opinions were utilized in less than 1% of all transactions in trials where they were 
identified as trustworthy.  
For the second method, our results show that honest friends with similar opinions 
were identified as trustworthy in all the 100 trials, they were among the earliest to be 
identified as trustworthy, and their opinions were utilized in 99% of all transactions in 
each trial. Honest friends with slightly different opinions were also identified as 
trustworthy in all the trials, and their opinions were utilized 91% to 99% of all 
transactions in each trial.  Honest friends with very different opinions were 
erroneously identified as trustworthy in 11% of 100 trials, and their opinions were 
utilized less than 1% of all transactions in trials where they were identified as 
trustworthy.  Lying friends were erroneously identified as trustworthy in 7% of 100 
trials, and their opinions were utilized in 4% of all transactions in trials where they 
were identified as trustworthy.  
We showed that once trustworthy friends have been identified and their opinions have 
been utilized in decision making, buyers using our models of identifying friends have 
superior performance than a buyer acting alone at lower levels of purchases and for 
increasing numbers of sellers in the market.  Between the two methods, a buyer 
utilizing the second method of identifying trusted friends had a superior performance 
compared to a buyer using the first method of identifying trusted friends.  We also 
conducted experiments to determine the optimum range of the incrementing and 
decrementing factors for a friend’s reputation. 
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In this dissertation we also considered risk taking and conservative attitudes of 
buyers.  A buyer with risk tasking attitude considers a new seller as reputable initially 
and tends to purchase from a new seller if they are offering the lowest price among 
reputable sellers.  A buyer with conservative attitude is cautious in its approach and 
explores new sellers at a rate proportional to the ratio of unexplored sellers to all the 
sellers who have sent bids.  Our results show that, when the buyers are making 
decisions based on their own information, a buyer with conservative attitude has the 
best performance.  When the buyers are utilizing information provided by their 
trusted friends, a buyer with risk taking attitude and utilizing only the trusted friend’s 
opinions of sellers (second method of identifying trusted friends) has the best 
performance. 
5.2 Future Research Directions 
 Currently in our model, the buyer gives equal importance to its own 
impressions about a seller and information gathered from trusted friends about 
that seller.  We would like to study the effect of varying the importance given 
to each component in determining the net rating of sellers. 
 This dissertation has focused on strategies that buyers can use to find desirable 
sellers.  When sellers are new to the market or to the buyers, conservative 
buyers may not buy immediately from them.  New sellers may have to wait 
for a while before a buyer decides to give them a chance.  This may again 
depend on the seller’s pricing strategy.  In Fire [24], researchers have 
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suggested certified reputation.  In certified reputation, an agent gathers its 
ratings from its interaction partners and provides them to a potential 
interaction partner.  However, sellers who are new to the market have to still 
establish their reputation.  In [49], Tran uses reinforcement learning to vary 
the seller’s price to maximize the seller’s profits.  We would like to explore 
what sellers can do to in order to increase their profits, attract new buyers, and 
maintain their profits. 
 The buyer strategies presented in this dissertation and the future works 
suggested so far have been based on fixed prices by sellers.  We would like to 
extend this work by incorporating negotiation strategies on both buyer and 
seller sides. 
 We would like to develop an interface to the agents so that human buyers and 
sellers can customize their agents’ characteristics.  For example, in the case of 
buyers, it could be attitude towards risk, negotiating strategy, the buyer’s own 
knowledge of the market to be transferred to his/her agent.  In the case of 
sellers, it could be sellers pricing strategy.  In [9] Chavez et. al. conducted real 
life experiments with Kasbah [8].  Kasbah is an electronic market place where 
seller and buyer agents autonomously negotiate with each other on behalf of 
their human counterparts to achieve their desired goals.  In [9] Chavez et. al 
reported the results of conducting a day’s experiment with people acting as 
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buyers or sellers and instructing their agents to buyer and sell items.  We also 
would like to do a real life experiment with our electronic market place. 
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